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Abstract
We consider the black-box reduction from multi-dimensional revenue maximization to virtual welfare
maximization. Cai et al. [12, 13, 14, 15] show a polynomial-time approximation-preserving reduction,
however, the mechanism produced by their reduction is only approximately Bayesian incentive compatible
(ε-BIC). We provide a new polynomial time transformation that converts any ε-BIC mechanism to an
exactly BIC mechanism with only a negligible revenue loss. Our transformation applies to a very general
mechanism design setting and only requires sample access to the agents’ type distributions and query
access to the original ε-BIC mechanism. Other ε-BIC to BIC transformations exist in the literature [23, 35, 18]
but all require exponential time to run. As an application of our transformation, we improve the reduction
by Cai et al. [12, 13, 14, 15] to generate an exactly BIC mechanism.
Our transformation builds on a novel idea developed in a recent paper by Dughmi et al. [24]: finding
the maximum entropy regularized matching using Bernoulli factories. The original algorithm by Dughmi et
al. [24] can only handle graphs with nonnegative edge weights, while our transformation requires finding
the maximum entropy regularized matching on graphs with both positive and negative edge weights. The
main technical contribution of this paper is a new algorithm that can accommodate arbitrary edge weights.
∗Supported by a Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship.
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design is the study of optimization algorithms with the additional constraint of incentive com-
patibility. A central theme of algorithmic mechanism design is thus to understand how much this extra
constraint hinders our ability to optimize a certain objective efficiently. In the best scenario, one may hope
to establish an equivalence between a mechanism design problem and an algorithm design problem, man-
ifested via a black-box reduction that converts any algorithm to an incentive compatible mechanism. In this
paper, we study the black-box reduction of a central problem in mechanism design: multi-dimensional rev-
enue maximization.
The problem description is simple: an auctioneer is selling a collection of items to one or more strategic
bidders. We follow the standard Bayesian assumption, that is, each bidder’s type is drawn independently
from a distribution known to all other bidders and the auctioneer. The auctioneer’s goal is to design a
Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism that maximizes the expected revenue.
In the special case of single-item auction, Myerson provides an elegant characterization of the optimal
mechanism. Indeed, Myerson’s solution can be viewed as a black-box reduction from revenue maximiza-
tion to the algorithmic problem of (virtual) welfare maximization [32]. A long-standing open question
is whether the black-box reduction can be generalized to multi-dimensional settings. In a recent break-
through, Cai et al. [12, 13, 14, 15] show that there is a polynomial-time approximation-preserving black-box
reduction from multi-dimensional revenue maximization to the algorithmic question of (virtual) welfare optimization.
However, this result still has the following two caveats: (i) the revenue of the mechanism is only guaranteed
to be within an additive ε of the optimum; and (ii) the mechanism is only approximately Bayesian incentive
compatible. Thus, an immediate open problem following their result is whether these two compromises
are inevitable. In this paper, we show that approximately Bayesian incentive compatibility is unnecessary
through our first main result:
Result I: There is a polynomial-time approximation-preserving black-box reduction from multi-
dimensional revenue maximization to the algorithmic question of (virtual) welfare optimiza-
tion that generates an exactly Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
Result I is enabled by a new polynomial time ε-BIC to BIC transformation, which is our second main
result:
Result II: There is a polynomial-time ε-BIC to BIC transformation that converts any approximately
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism to an exactly Bayesian incentive compatible mech-
anism with a negligible revenue loss for any downward-closed environment.
The transformation is fully general and applicable to any downward-closed mechanism design setting 1.
We believe the transformation is of independent interest and would have numerous applications in mecha-
nism design. Indeed, our black-box reduction follows straightforwardly from applying the transformation
to the mechanism of Cai et al. [12, 13, 14, 15]. Note that other ε-BIC to BIC transformations have been pro-
posed in the literature [23, 35, 18], however, all of the existing transformations require solving a #P-hard
problem repeatedly [27] and therefore cannot be made computationally efficient.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We first fix some notations to facilitate our discussion of the results. We consider a general mechanism
design environment where there is a set of feasible outcomes denoted by O, which we assume to be
downward-closed. There are n agents, and each agent i has a type ti drawn from distribution Di inde-
pendently. We use Ti to denote the support of Di, and for every ti ∈ Ti, vi(ti, ·) is a valuation func-
tion that maps every outcome to a real number in [0,1]. A mechanism M consists of an allocation rule
x(·) :×i∈[n] Ti 7→ ∆(O) and a payment rule p(·) :×i∈[n] Ti 7→ Rn. We slightly abuse notation to define
1Roughly speaking the setting is downward-closed if the agents have the choice to not participate in the mechanism. See Section 2
for the formal definition.
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vi(ti, x(b)) ≡ Eo∼x(b)[vi(ti, o)]. If we have query access toM, then on any query bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn),
we receive an outcome o ∼ x(b) and payments p1(b), . . . , pn(b).
Equiped with the notations, we are ready to discuss our ε-BIC to BIC transformation.
Informal Theorem 1 (ε-BIC to BIC transformation). Given sample access to a collection of distributions (Di)i∈[n],
and query access to an ε-BIC and individually rational (IR) mechanismM = (x, p) with respect to×i∈[n]Di. We
can construct another mechanismM′ that is exactly BIC and IR with respect to×i∈[n]Di, and its revenue is at most
O(n
√
ε) worse than the revenue of M. Moreover, for any bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn), M′ computes an outcome
o ∈ O and payments p1(b), . . . , pn(b) in expected running time poly
(
∑i∈[n] |Ti|, 1/ε
)
and makes in expectation
at most poly
(
∑i∈[n] |Ti|, 1/ε
)
queries toM.
Previous transformations can produce aM′ with similar guarantees but require time poly(∏i∈[n] |Ti|)
to run [23, 35, 18]. Our result achieves an exponential speedup. To illustrate our new ideas, we first briefly
review the construction in the literature. In the heart of all the previous constructions lies the problem
called replica-surrogate matching.
Replica-Surrogate Matching For each agent i, form a bipartite graph Gi. The left hand side nodes are
called replicas, which are types sampled i.i.d. from Di. In particular, the true type ti of agent i is one of
the replicas. On the right hand side, the nodes are called surrogates, which are also types sampled from
Di. The edge between a replica with type t(j) and a surrogate with type t(k) is assigned weight wjk ≡
Et−i∼D−i [vi(t
(j), x(t(k), t−i))− pi(t(k), t−i)] 2, which is the interim utility of agent i when her true type is t(j)
but reports t(k) toM. Compute the maximum weight matching on Gi. The true type ti selects a surrogate
using the matching to compete inM. Agent i competes inM using the type of the surrogate she is matched
to in the maximum weight matching.
The intuition is that since M is not BIC, the true type ti may prefer the outcome and payment from
reporting some different type. The matching is set up to allow the true type ti to pick a more favorable
type to compete in M for it. But why wouldn’t the agent misreport in the matching? After all, the edge
weights depend on the agent’s report. As it turns out, to guarantee incentive compatibility, one needs to
find a matching with a maximal-in-range algorithm. Namely, the matched surrogate is selected to maximize
the agent’s induced utility less some cost that only depends on the outcome. It is not hard to verify that the
maximum weight matching is indeed maximal-in-range, and therefore the agent has no incentive to lie.
But why does the maximum weight matching take exponential time to find? The problem is that we
are not given the edge weights. For each edge, we can only sample from a distribution whose mean is
the weight of the edge. Simply sample t−i from D−i and compute vi(t(j), x(t(k), t−i))− pi(t(k), t−i). Even
if we assume that we know the distributions (Di)i∈[n], it still takes time poly(∏j 6=i |Tj|) to compute the
weight of a single edge exactly. But why can’t we first estimate the edge weights with samples and find
the maximum matching using the estimated weights? The issue is that no matter how many samples we
take, the empirical mean will be off by some estimation error. The maximal-in-range property is so fragile
that even a tiny bit of estimation error can cause the algorithm to violate the property, making the whole
mechanism not incentive compatible. See Example 1 in Appendix A for a more detailed explanation.
Black-box Reduction for Welfare Maximization To overcome the difficulty, we turn to another important
problem in mechanism design, black-box reduction for welfare maximization, for inspiration. A line of
beautiful results [28, 8, 27, 24] initiated by Hartline and Lucier shows that the mechanism design problem
of welfare maximization in the Bayesian setting can be black-box reduced to the algorithmic problem of
welfare maximization. The replica-surrogate matching is again the central piece in the reduction. Indeed,
the idea of replica-surrogate matching was first proposed by Hartline et al. [26, 27], and later introduced
by Daskalakis and Weinberg [23] to the study of ε-BIC to BIC transformation. The main difference of the
two scenarios is the way the edge weights are defined. For welfare maximization, the edge weight between
2The true weight wjk ≡ Et−i∼D−i
[
vi
(
t(j), x
(
t(k), t−i
))
− (1− η)pi
(
t(k), t−i
)]
is computed using a discounted price, but we can
ignore the difference for now.
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a replica t(j) and a surrogate t(k) is vjk ≡ Et−i∼D−i [vi(t(j), x(t(k), t−i))], namely, the interim value for agent
i when her true type is t(j) but reports t(k) toM. To distinguish the two settings, we will refer to the one
with interim utilities as edge weights the U-replica-surrogate matching and the one with interim values as
edge weights the V-replica-surrogate matching. Clearly, it also takes exponential time to compute the exact
maximum weight V-replica-surrogate matching due to the same reason discussed above.
A striking result by Dughmi et al. [24] shows how to circumvent this barrier for welfare maximiza-
tion. Their solution has the following two main components: (i) a polynomial time maximal-in-range al-
gorithm to solve the maximum entropy regularized matching problem; (ii) the fast exponential Bernoulli race, a
new Bernoulli factory, that allows them to execute the algorithm in (i) exactly with only sample access to
distributions whose means are the edge weights 3. They use the algorithm to find a maximum entropy reg-
ularized V-replica-surrogate matching, and argue that this matching has approximately maximum weight,
which allows them to conclude that their new mechanism loses at most a negligible fraction of the welfare.
Our Technical Contributions Our result is directly inspired by [24], but differs in several major ways.
Our plan is to design an algorithm with similar guarantees for U-replica-surrogate matchings. A subtle but
crucial difference between our problem and theirs is that the V-replica-surrogate matching only contains
positive edge weights4, so their algorithm only needs to search for a perfect matching, while a U-replica-
surrogate matching may contain negative edge weights. Directly applying their algorithm to our problem
produces an optimum perfect matching, however, the matching could be far away from the true maximum
due to the negative edges. One may try to remove the negative edges using samples. However, removing
edges based on the empirical means from samples could easily violate the maximal-in-range property. See
example 1 in Appendix A .
We provide a surprising reduction from the case of arbitrary edge weights to the case with only positive
edge weights. Indeed, our reduction can be succinctly summarized by the following formula, if an edge
has weight wjk, set the new weight by applying the δ-softplus function to wjk5:
ζδ(wjk) = δ · log
(
exp
(
wjk/δ
)
+ 1
)
,
where δ > 0 is a parameter of our algorithm. Note that for any value of wjk, ζδ(wjk) is always nonnegative!
Moreover, the maximum entropy regularized matching on weights (ζδ(wjk))j,k can be shown to be close to
the maximum weight matching on (wjk)j,k. So it seems that we only need to run the algorithm from [24]
on the new weights (ζδ(wjk))j,k. An astute reader may have already realized that being able to run the
algorithm on (wjk)j,k does not imply that one can run the algorithm on (ζδ(wjk))j,k, as we can only sample
from distributions whose means are (wjk)j,k but not (ζδ(wjk))j,k. One idea is to construct a Bernoulli factory
to simulate a ζδ(wjk)-coin using a wjk-coin. To the best of our knowledge, no such construction exists.
We take a different approach and make use of a crucial property of the algorithm from [24]. Namely, if
we run their algorithm with the same parameter δ, the algorithm only needs to sample from the softmax
function over the weights. More specifically, with weights (wjk)j,k, it suffices to have the ability to sample
an edge (j, k) with probability exactly
exp(wjk/δ)
∑k′ exp(wjk′/δ)
. Despite the fact that we cannot directly sample from
distributions with means (ζδ(wjk))j,k, we can indeed sample edge (j, k) with exactly the right probability, as
exp
(
ζδ(wjk)/δ
)
∑k′ exp
(
ζδ(wjk′)/δ
) = exp
(
wjk/δ
)
+ 1
∑k′
(
exp(wjk′/δ) + 1
) ,
which can be sampled efficiently using the fast exponential Bernoulli race given only sample access to
distributions with means equal to the original edge weights (wjk)j,k.
3A Bernoulli factory is an algorithm that with sample access to a p-coin to simulate a f (p)-coin. Please see [29, 33] and the references
therein for more details.
4Dughmi et al. [24] make the assumption that for any agent i, type ti and any outcome o ∈ O, vi(ti , o) ≥ 0.
5The function log (exp (x) + 1) is known as the soft plus function.
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Our second contribution is to show that an approximately maximum U-replica-surrogate matching suf-
fices to guarantee only a small loss in revenue. Previous results [23, 35, 18] only prove the statement for the
exactly maximum matching. We provide a more delicate analysis that allows us to extend the statement
to approximately maximum matchings. Finally, as the agent may receive negative utility from certain sur-
rogates, we sometimes need to subsidize the agent to ensure individually rationality. We provide a new
careful treatment of the payment rule to guarantee that such payments are small compared to the revenue.
Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization We next apply the ε-BIC to BIC transformation to obtain our
black-box reduction for revenue maximization. We first introduce the problem formally.
Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization (MRM): Given as input n type distributionsD1, . . . ,Dn and
a set of feasible outcomes O, output a BIC and IR mechanism M who chooses outcomes from O with
probability 1 and whose expected revenue is optimal relative to any other, possibly randomized, BIC,
and IR mechanism with respect to D =×i∈[n]Di.
To state our black-box reduction, we also need to introduce the virtual welfare optimization problem.
Virtual Welfare Optimization (VWO): Given as input n functions Ci(·) : Ti 7→ R and a set of fea-
sible outcomes O, output an outcome o ∈ argmaxx∈O ∑i ∑ti∈Ti Ci(ti) · vi(ti, x). We refer to the sum
∑i ∑ti∈Ti Ci(ti) · vi(ti, x) as the virtual welfare of outcome x.
Informal Theorem 2. Given distribution×ni=1Di and oracle access to an α-approximation Algorithm G for VWO,
we can construct an exactly BIC and IR mechanismM = (x, p) with respect to×i∈[n]Di, that has expected revenue
α ·OPT −O (n√ε), where OPT is the optimal revenue over all BIC and IR mechanisms with respect to×i∈[n]Di.
The running time is poly
(
∑i∈[n] |Ti|, 1ε , b, rtG
(
poly
(
∑i∈[n] |Ti|, 1ε , b
)))
, where rtG(·) is the running time of G,
and b is an upper bound on the bit complexity of vi(ti, o) for any agent i, any type ti, and any outcome o.
Our reduction also holds even when we only have sample access to the distribution×ni=1Di (Theorem 6).
1.2 Further Related Work
Multi-dimensional revenue maximization has recently received lots of attention from computer scientists.
Significant progress has been on the computational front [19, 20, 1, 11, 2, 12, 13, 17, 15, 3, 9, 22, 30]. On the
structural front, a family of simple mechanisms, i.e., variants of sequential posted price and two-part tariff
mechanisms, have been shown to achieve constant factor approximations of the optimal revenue in quite
general settings [5, 36, 35, 16, 21, 18]. ε-BIC to BIC transformation has been an instrumental tool in obtaining
both the computational and structural results [23, 35, 18, 30].
There has also been significant interest in understanding the sample complexity for learning an almost
revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings. Last year, Gonczarowski and Weinberg [25] show that
one can learn an almost revenue-optimal ε-BIC mechanism using poly(n, m, 1/ε) samples under the item-
independence assumption, where n is the number of bidders and m is the number of items. Brustle et
al. [10] generalize the result to settings where the item values are drawn from correlated but structured
distributions that can be modeled by either Markov random fields or Bayesian Networks. The mechanism
they produce is still ε-BIC. Our transformation can certainly convert these mechanisms from [25, 10] into
exactly BIC mechanisms, and the transformation requires poly
(
∑i∈[n] |Ti|, 1/ε
)
many samples. Unfortu-
nately, each |Ti| is already exponential in m in their settings. The dependence on |Ti| is unavoidable for
us, as our goal is to provide a transformation that is applicable to a general mechanism design setting.
Nonetheless, we suspect the techniques we develop in this paper can be combined with special structure of
the distribution to provide more sample-efficient ε-BIC to BIC transformations.
1.3 Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we provide the notations that we use throughout the paper. In Section 3, we describe two
powerful tools from the literature, the Replica-Surrogate Matching Mechanism and the Entropy Regularized
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Matching, that are useful for us. In Section 4, we provide our new algorithm that solves the entropy regu-
larized matching problem for graphs with arbitrary edge weights. In particular, we will show the arbitrary
edge weight case can be reduced to the nonnegative edge weight case. In Section 5, we describe our ε-BIC
to BIC transformation. In Section 6, we show how to use our ε-BIC to BIC transformation to improve the
black-box reduction for multi-dimensional revenue maximization.
2 Preliminaries
We specify a general mechanism design setting by the tuple (n,V ,D, v,O). There are n agents participating
in the mechanism. We use O to denote the set of all possible outcomes. We assume that each o ∈ O can be
written as a vector o = (o1, ..., on)where oi is the outcome for agent i. We also assume that the a null outcome
⊥ is available to each agent i. One can think of⊥ as the option of not participating in the mechanism. In the
paper, we assume that the outcome space O is downward-closed, that is, for every o = (o1, ..., on) ∈ O, any
o′ = (o′1, ..., o
′
n) with o′i = oi or o
′
i =⊥ for every i is also inO. An example of this setting is the combinatorial
auction, where the outcome set contains all possible ways to allocate items to agents, and the null outcome
represents allocating nothing to the agent.
Each agent i has a type ti from type space Vi, which is drawn independently from some distribution Di.
We use Ti ⊆ Vi to denote the support ofDi. We useD to denote×i∈[n]Di. In the paper we consider discrete
type spaces, we assume that every |Ti| ≤ T for some finite T. Note that our results can easily be extended
to the continuous case using similar techniques as in [24]. For every ti ∈ Vi, vi(ti, ·) is a valuation function
that maps every outcome to a real number in [0, 1]. In particular, vi(ti,⊥) = 0 for all agent i and type ti.
Every agent is risk-neutral and has quasi-linear utility.
For any mechanismM, denote REV(M,D) = Et∼D
[
∑i∈[n] pi(t)
]
the expected revenue ofM. We use
REV(M) for short when the agents’ distributions and valuation functions are clear. We use the standard
definitions of BIC, ε-BIC, IR, and ε-IR. We include their definitions in Appendix B for completeness. Finally,
we use log(·) to denote the natural logarithm and ∆` to denote the set of all distributions over ` elements.
Definition 1 (Gibbs Distribution). For any integer `, define the Gibbs distribution z ∈ ∆` over ` states with
temperature β as zi =
exp(Ei/β)
∑i′∈[`] exp(Ei′/β)
for all i ∈ [`], where Ei is the energy of element i.
3 Tools from the Literature
In this section, we review two crucial tools for us: the replica-surrogate matching mechanism and the online
entropy regularized matching.
3.1 Replica-Surrogate Matching Mechanism
We provide a detailed description of the the replica-surrogate matching mechanism used in [23, 35, 18].
For each agent i, the mechanism generates a number of replicas and surrogates from Di, and maps the
agent’s type ti to one of the surrogates via a maximum weight replica-surrogate matching, and charges the
agent the corresponding VCG payment. Then let the matched surrogate participate in the mechanism for
the agent. Formally, suppose we are given query access to a mechanismM = (x, p), we construct a new
mechanismM′ using the following two-phase procedure:
Phase 1: Surrogate Selection For each agent i,
1. Given her reported type ti ∈ Di, create `− 1 replicas sampled i.i.d. from Di and ` surrogates sampled
i.i.d. from Di. The value of ` is specified in Corollary 1.
2. Construct a weighted bipartite graph between replicas (and agent i’s true type ti) and surrogates. The
weight between the j-th replica r(j) and the k-th surrogate s(k) is the interim value of agent i when
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her true type is r(j) but reported s(k) toM less the interim payment for reporting s(k) multiplied by
(1− η):
Wi(r(j), s(k)) = E
t−i∼D−i
[
vi(r(j), x(s(k), t−i))
]
− (1− η) · E
t−i∼D−i
[
pi(s(k), t−i)
]
. (1)
3. Treat Wi(r(j), s(k)) as the value of replica r(j) for being matched to surrogate s(k). Run the VCG mech-
anism among the replicas, that is, compute the maximum weight matching w.r.t. edge weight Wi(·, ·)
and the corresponding VCG payments. If a replica (or type ti) is unmatched in the maximum match-
ing, match it to a random unmatched surrogate.
Phase 2: Surrogate Competition Let si be the surrogate matched with the agent i’s true type ti. Run
mechanism M under input s = (s1, . . . , sn). Let o = (o1, . . . , on) be a the outcome generated by x(s). If
agent i is matched in the maximum matching, her outcome is oi and her expected payment is (1− η) · pi(s)
plus the VCG payment for winning surrogate si in the first phase; Otherwise the agent gets the null outcome
⊥ and pays 0.
Agent i
Agent j
si
sj
tj
ti
M
M′
O = (o1, o2, . . . , on)
Figure 1: With • we denote the replicas and with  the surrogates
The following lemma shows thatM′ is BIC and IR. We include the proof in Appendix D for complete-
ness.
Lemma 1. [26, 8, 23, 35, 18]M′ is BIC and IR.
Moreover, when ` is sufficiently large, the revenue ofM′ is close to the revenue ofM.
Corollary 1. [23, 35, 18] IfM is an ε-BIC and IR mechanism w.r.t. D, then for any η ∈ (0, 1) and any ` > T
ε2
,
REV(M′,D) ≥ (1− η)REV(M,D)−Θ(nε)/η.
Corollary 1 follows from a special case of Lemma 13 when ∆ = 0 and d = 1. The main takeaway of this
corollary is that the above mechanismM′ indeed satisfies the requirement of an ε-BIC to BIC transforma-
tion. However, as we discussed in Section 1.1, the mechanism runs in exponential time.
3.2 Online Entropy Regularized Matching
We introduce another crucial tool, the online entropy regularized matching algorithm, developed by Dughmi et
al. [24]. The original application is to find a matching close to the maximum weight V-replica-surrogate
matching, but the algorithm is general and can be applied to any d-to-1 bipartite matching with positive
edge weights.
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d-to-1 Matching For every integer `, and d, consider the complete bipartite graph between d` left hand
side nodes (called LHS-nodes) and ` right hand side nodes (called RHS-nodes). Let ωjk be the edge weight
between LHS-node j and RHS-node k for j ∈ [d`], k ∈ [`]. For ease of notation, let ωj = (ωjk)k∈[`], ω =
(ωj)j∈[d`], and ω−j = (ωj′)j′ 6=j. A matching is called a d-to-1 matching if every LHS-node is matched to at
most one RHS-node, and every RHS-node is matched to at most d LHS-nodes. A d-to-1 matching is called
perfect if every LHS-node is matched to one RHS-node, and every RHS-node is matched to exactly d LHS-
nodes.
In this section, we focus on the case where all edge weights ω are nonnegative, and we refer to this case
as the nonnegative weight d-to-1 matching. In Section 4, we generalize the results to arbitrary weights.
The optimal d-to-1 matching is simply a maximum weight bipartite matching problem. The challenge is
that the weights are not given. For every edge (j, k), we only have sample access to a distribution Fjk whose
expectation is ωjk. To the best of our knowledge, none of the algorithms for finding a maximum weight
bipartite matching can be implemented exactly with such sample access to the edge weights. Moreover, as
we require the replica-surrogate matching mechanism to be incentive compatible, the algorithm should be
maximal-in-range. Therefore, finding the maximum weight matching using the empirical means is also not
an option, as it violates the maximal-in-range property (see the discussion in Section 1.1).
Dughmi et al. [24] provide a polynomial time maximal-in-range algorithm to compute an approximately
maximum weight perfect d-to-1 matching. Note that the weight of the optimal perfect matching is the same
as the optimal matching for nonnegative edge weights. The first key idea is to find a “soft maximum weight
matching” instead of the maximum weight matching by adding an entropy function as a regularizer to the
total weight.
Definition 2. Given parameter δ > 0, the (offline) entropy regularized matching program (P) is:
max ∑
j,k
zjk ·ωjk − δ∑
j,k
zjk log(zjk)
subject to ∑
j
zjk ≤ d, ∀k ∈ [`]
∑
k
zjk = 1, ∀j ∈ [d`]
zjk ∈ [0, 1], ∀j ∈ [d`], ∀k ∈ [`].
(2)
Take the Lagrangian dual of (P) by Lagrangifing the constraints ∑j zjk ≤ d, ∀k ∈ [`]:
L(z, α) =∑
j,k
zjkωjk − δ∑
j,k
zjk log(zjk)−∑
k
αk(d−∑
j
zjk).
The following lemma follows from the first-order condition: for any dual variables α, the optimal solution
for the Lagrangian is given by a collection of Gibbs distribution z∗ = (z∗j )j∈[d`].
Lemma 2. [24] For every dual variables α ∈ [0, h]`, the optimal solution z∗ maximizing the Lagrangian L(z, α)
subject to constraints ∑k z∗jk = 1, ∀j ∈ [d`] is: z∗jk =
exp
(
ωjk−αk
δ
)
∑k′∈[`] exp
(
ωjk′ −αk′
δ
) , ∀j ∈ [d`], k ∈ [`].
If for every edge (j, k), we are given sample access to a distribution Fjk whose mean is ωjk ∈ [0, 1], we can use the
fast exponential Bernoulli race [24] to sample from the Gibbs distribution z∗j for all j ∈ [d`]. In particular, each
sample from distribution z∗j = (z
∗
j1, . . . , z
∗
j`) only requires in expectation poly(h, `, 1/δ) many samples from (Fjk)k
(Corollary 5).
If the optimal dual variables α∗ are known, by complementary slackness, the corresponding z∗ in Lemma 2
is the optimal solution of (P). The gap between the expected weight of z∗ and the maximum weight is at
most the value of the maximum entropy δ · d` log `, so we can simply use the matching sampled according
to the distribution z∗. However, as the optimal dual is unknown, the wrong dual variables α may cause
a loss of ∑k αk(d − ∑j zjk), which may be too large when z is not computed based on the optimal dual
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variables. To resolve this difficulty, Dughmi et al. [24] introduce the second key idea – Online Entropy
Regularized Matching algorithm (Algorithm 1). The online algorithm gradually learns a set of dual variables
close to the optimum α∗. When the algorithm terminates, it is guaranteed to find a close to optimal solution
to program (P).
Algorithm 1 Online Entropy Regularized Matching with Non-negative Edge Weights (with parameters δ, η′,γ)
Require: Sample access to the distribution Fjk whose expectation is ωjk, for every j ∈ [d`], k ∈ [`].
1: for j ∈ [d`] do
2: Let d(j−1)k be the number of LHS-nodes matched to RHS-node k in the current matching and K = {k :
d(j−1)k < d}.
3: Set α(j) according to the Gibbs distribution with energy d(j−1)k for RHS-node k ∈ K and temperature
1/η′, and α(j)k = 0 for all k 6∈ K.
4: Match LHS-node j to a RHS-node k ∈ K according to the Gibbs distribution zˆj over RHS-nodes in K,
where the temperature is δ and the energy for matching to a RHS-node k ∈ K is (ωjk − γα(j)k ). We can
generate a sample from zˆj via the fast exponential Bernoulli race with poly(γ, `, 1/δ) sample from
(Fjk)k in expectation (See Corollary 5 for details).
5: end for
Clearly, the algorithm always returns a perfect d-to-1 matching.
Definition 3 (Maximal-in-Range Algorithms). An algorithm is maximal-in-range, if for every j ∈ [d`], there
exists a cost function c(·), which may depend on ω−j, such that the allocation zj ∈ argmaxz′∈F ∑j,k z′jk ·ωjk − c(z′)
for any ωj, where F is a set of all feasible allocations.
From Lemma 3, the algorithm is also maximal-in-range for any choice of the parameters δ, η′,γ.
Lemma 3. [24] For every j, α(j) and parameter γ, the Gibbs distribution zˆj (specified in step 4) is maximal-in-range,
as
zˆj ∈ argmaxz′∈∆|K| ∑
k∈K
z′jkωjk − δ ∑
k∈K
z′jk log(z
′
jk)− ∑
k∈K
γα
(j)
k · z′jk 6.
How about the performance of Algorithm 1? Dughmi et al. [24] show that for any choice of δ, η′ > 0
and `, if d ≥ ` log `/η′2 and γ ∈
[
OPT(P)
d ,
O(1)·OPT(P)
d
]
, where OPT(P) is the optimum of program (P), the
solution of Algorithm 1 is a (1−O(η′)) multiplicative approximation to OPT(P), which implies that the
expected weight of the solution is close to the weight of the maximum matching. Theorem 1 summarize
these guarantees.
Theorem 1. [24] When ωjk ∈ [0, 1] 7 for all j ∈ [d`], k ∈ [`], Algorithm 1 satisfies the following properties:
1. For any choice of the parameters, it always returns a perfect d-to-1 matching.
2. For any choice of the parameters, the algorithm is maximal-in-range. The expected running time and sample
complexity of Algorithm 1 is poly(d, `,γ, 1/δ).
3. For every δ, η′ > 0, if d ≥ ` log `/η′2 and γ ∈
[
OPT(P)
d ,
O(1)·OPT(P)
d
]
, where OPT(P) is the optimum of pro-
gram (P), the expected value (over the randomness of the Algorithm 1) of∑j∈[d`],k∈[`] zˆjkωjk− δ∑j,k zˆjk log(zˆjk)
is at least (1−O(η′)) ·OPT(P).
Moreover, for every ψ ∈ (0, 1), if we set δ = Θ( ψlog ` ), η′ = Θ(ψ), and d and γ satisfy the conditions
above, then the expected total weight of the matching output by the algorithm is at most O(d`ψ) less than the
maximum weight matching.
6Notice that α(j) only depends on the weights incident to the LHS-nodes 1 to j− 1.
7The theorem applies to any bounded edge weights ωjk ∈ [0,R]. For simplicity we normalize the edge weights to lie between [0, 1].
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The only part that we have not yet explained is how to choose a γ that is a constant factor approximation
to OPT(P)d . Dughmi et al. [24] show a polynomial time randomized algorithm that produces a γ that falls into[
OPT(P)
d ,
O(1)·OPT(P)
d
]
with high probability, which suffices to find a close to optimum V-replica-surrogate
matching. Please see Appendix C for details.
4 d-to-1 Matching with Arbitrary Edge Weights
To obtain an ε-BIC to BIC transformation, we need to find a near-optimal U-surrogate-replica matching,
where edge weights may be negative. Motivated by this application, we provide a generalization of Theo-
rem 1 to general d-to-1 matchings with arbitrary edge weights. We design a new algorithm (Algorithm 2)
with guarantees summarized in Theorem 2.
Before stating our algorithm, we first point out several issues of directly applying Algorithm 1 to the
general d-to-1 matching problem. As Algorithm 1 always produces a perfect matching, we will find a
perfect matching whose weight is close to the maximum perfect matching, which unfortunately could be
far less than the true maximum 8.
A tempting way to fix the issue may be to first remove all edges with negative weights then run Algo-
rithm 1. With only sample access to Fjk, one way to achieve this is to remove edges with negative empirical
means. In fact, with a sufficiently large number of samples, with high probability, all edges with strictly
positive weights will remain and all edges with strictly negative weights will be removed. However, with
non-zero probability, some edges will either be kept or removed incorrectly causing the algorithm to violate
the maximal-in-range property. See Example 1 for a concrete construction.
An alternative way is to relax the constraint ∑k zjk = 1 to ∑k zjk ≤ 1, so the algorithm no longer needs
to find a perfect matching. However, Lemma 2 fails to hold as the optimal solution is no longer a Gibbs
distribution and it is unclear how to sample efficiently from it with only sample access to Fjk 9. A similar
attempt is to add a slack variable y to (P), modifying the constraint ∑k zjk = 1 to ∑k zjk + y = 1. It is
equivalent to adding one dummy RHS-node, with weight 0 on every incident edge. Now for every dual
variable, the optimal solution for the Lagrangian follows from a Gibbs distribution. However, the program
differs from (P), in particular the new dummy RHS-node has no capacity constraint, and as a result there
is no dual variable that corresponds to this dummy node. It is not clear how to modify Algorithm 1 to
accommodate the new dummy node and to produce a close to maximum matching.
4.1 Reduction from Arbitrary Weights to Non-Negative Weights
In this section, we provide a reduction from the d-to-1 matching with arbitrary edge weight case to the
non-negative edge weight case.
Definition 4. For arbitrary edge weights (ωjk)jk and parameter δ > 0, define the δ-softplus function:
ζδ(ωjk) = δ · log(exp(ωjk/δ) + 1)
8If all the edge weights are negative and arbitrarily small, the optimal perfect matching has arbitrarily negative weight, while the
weight of the optimal matching is always non-negative.
9The issue is that ∑k z∗jk may be strictly less than 1 and has a complex expression. It is not clear whether we can sample efficiently
from z∗j with only sample access to (Fjk)jk . Moreover, even if we can sample from the distribution, the guarantees in Theorem 1 may
no longer hold.
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Consider the entropy regularized matching program (P′) w.r.t. weights (ζδ(ωjk))jk:
max ∑
j,k
zjk · ζδ(ωjk)− δ ·∑
j,k
zjk log(zjk)
subject to ∑
j
zjk ≤ d, ∀k ∈ [`]
∑
k
zjk = 1, ∀j ∈ [d`]
zjk ∈ [0, 1], ∀j ∈ [d`], ∀k ∈ [`].
(3)
Note that ζδ(x) > 0 for any x, so the program (P′) is exactly a d-to-1 matching with positive edge
weights. Let zˆ be the solution produced by Algorithm 1 on (P′). We know that
G(zˆ) =∑
j,k
zˆjk · ζδ(ωjk)− δ ·∑
j,k
zˆjk log(zˆjk)
is close to the optimal solution of (P′). However, if we match a LHS-node j to a RHS-node according to the
Gibbs distribution zˆj, it is not yet clear how the expected weight of the matching relates to G(zˆ), as the real
edge weight is ωjk instead of ζδ(ωjk). Also, we do not know whether the optimum of (P′) is close to the
maximum weight matching.
To address these two issues, we introduce an auxiliary convex program (P′′).
Definition 5. For any parameter δ > 0, we define the following auxiliary convex program (P”):
max ∑
j,k
xjkωjk − δ ·∑
j,k
(xjk log(xjk) + yjk log(yjk))
s.t. ∑
j
(xjk + yjk) ≤ d, ∀k ∈ [`]
∑
k
(xjk + yjk) = 1, ∀j ∈ [d`]
xjk, yjk ∈ [0, 1], ∀j, k
We prove in Lemma 4 that the optimum of (P′′) is exactly the same as the optimum of (P′). The proof
of Lemma 4 is postponed to Appendix E.
Lemma 4. For all j ∈ [d`] and k ∈ [`], if xjkyjk = exp(ωjk/δ), xjk + yjk = zjk, then
zjk · ζδ(ωjk)− δ · zjk log(zjk) = xjk ·ωjk − δ · xjk log(xjk)− δ · yjk log(yjk).
This implies that the optimal objective values of (P′) and (P′′) are equal.
Next, we present our algorithm (Algorithm 2), and show that
G(zˆ) = F(xˆ, yˆ) =∑
j,k
xˆjkωjk − δ∑
j,k
(xˆjk log(xˆjk) + yˆjk log(yˆjk)),
where (xˆjk, yˆjk)jk is the solution produced by Algorithm 2. In other words, running Algorithm 1 on (P′) is
equivalent to running Algorithm 2 on (P′′).
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Algorithm 2 Online Entropy Regularized Matching with Arbitrary Edge Weights (with parameters δ, η′,γ)
Require: Sample access to Fjk whose mean is ωjk, for every j, k.
1: For each RHS-node k, add a 0-RHS-node to the bipartite graph with edge weight 0 to every LHS-node.
We refer to the k-th original RHS-node the k-th normal-RHS-node.
2: for j ∈ [d`] do
3: Let d(j−1)k be the number of LHS-nodes matched to either the k-th normal-RHS-node or the k-th 0-
RHS-node in the current matching and K = {k : d(j−1)k < d}.
4: Set α(j) according to the Gibbs distribution over RHS-nodes in K, where the energy for any RHS-node
k ∈ K is d(j−1)k and the temperature is 1/η′. Set α
(j)
k = 0 for all k 6∈ K.
5: Match LHS-node j to a normal RHS-node (or a 0-RHS-node) k ∈ K according to the Gibbs
distribution over the 2|K| RHS-nodes in K , where the temperature is δ and the energy for
matching to a normal-RHS-node k is (ωjk − γα(j)k ) and the energy for matching to a 0-RHS-
node k ∈ K is (−γα(j)k ). More specifically, match to the normal-RHS-node k with probability
xˆjk =
exp((ωjk−γα(j)k )/δ)
∑k′∈K(exp((ωjk′−γα(j)k′ )/δ)+exp((−γα
(j)
k′ )/δ))
and match to the 0-RHS-node k with probability yˆjk =
exp((−γα(j)k )/δ)
∑k′∈K(exp((ωjk′−γα(j)k′ )/δ)+exp((−γα
(j)
k′ )/δ))
. We can generate a sample from (xˆj, yˆj) via the fast exponential
Bernoulli race with poly(γ, `, 1/δ) sample from (Fjk)k in expectation (See Corollary 5 for details).
6: end for
If we execute Algorithm 1 on a d-to-1 matching with weights (ζδ(ωjk))jk and Algorithm 2 over weights
(ωjk)jk with the same parameters δ, η′,γ, we can couple the two executions so that the dual variables α(j)
and the remaining capacities (d(j)k )k are the same for every j. Please see a concrete description of the
coupling in the Proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix E. An important consequence of the coupling is that
xˆjk + yˆjk = zˆjk for every j and k. To verify this, simply observe that
zˆjk = exp(
ζδ(ωjk)− γα(j)k
δ
) = (exp(
ωjk
δ
)+ 1) · exp(−γα
(j)
k
δ
) = exp(
ωjk − γα(j)k
δ
)+ exp(
−γα(j)k
δ
) = xˆjk + yˆjk.
Combining the observation with Lemma 4, we conclude that G(zˆ) = F(xˆ, yˆ). Therefore, if we choose
the correct parameters, F(xˆ, yˆ) is a multiplicative approximation to both the optimum of (P′) and (P′′) as
guaranteed by Theorem 1. Since the original d-to-1 matching instance does not contain the 0-RHS-nodes,
we just ignore those edges in the matching produced by Algorithm 2, and it is not hard to argue that
the matching has total weight close to the maximum weight matching. We summarize our result in the
following Theorem. The proof is postponed to Appendix E.
Theorem 2. When ωjk ∈ [−1, 1] 10 for all j ∈ [d`], k ∈ [`], Algorithm 2 satisfies the following properties:
1. For any choice of the parameters, dropping all the edges incident to any 0-RHS-nodes in the matching, the
algorithm produces a feasible d-to-1 matching (not necessarily perfect).
2. For any choice of the parameters, the algorithm is maximal-in-range. The expected running time and sample
complexity is poly(d, `, 1/δ,γ).
3. For every δ, η′ > 0, if d ≥ ` log `/η′2 and γ ∈
[
OPT(P′)
d ,
O(1)·OPT(P′)
d
]
, where OPT(P′) is the optimum
of program (P′), then the expected value (over the randomness of the Algorithm 2) of ∑j∈[d`],k∈[`] xˆjkωjk −
δ∑j,k xˆjk log(xˆjk)− δ∑j,k yˆjk log(yˆjk) is at least (1−O(η′)) ·OPT(P′).
Moreover, for every ψ ∈ (0, 1), if we set δ = Θ( ψlog ` ), η′ = Θ(ψ), and d and γ satisfy the conditions above,
then the expected value of ∑j∈[d`],k∈[`] xˆjkωjk, the expected total weight of the matching output by the algorithm
10Again the theorem applies to any bounded edge weights in [−R,R]. For simplicity we normalize the edge weights to lie in [−1, 1].
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Mechanism 3 ε-BIC to BIC Transformation (MechanismM′)
Require: Query access to an IR mechanism M = (x, p) w.r.t. D =×i∈[n]Di; sample access to the type
distribution Di and D′i for every i ∈ [n]; Parameters η, η′, δ, `, and d ≥ 32 log(8η
′−1)
δ2` log2(`)
.
Phase 1: Surrogate Selection
1: for i ∈ [n] do
2: Sample ` surrogates i.i.d. from Di. We use s to denote all surrogates.
3: Estimate γ with parameters η′ and δ using the algorithm in Lemma 5.
4: Agent i reports her type ti. Create d`− 1 replicas sampled i.i.d. from D′i and insert ti into the replicas
at a uniformly random position. We use r to denote all the d` replicas.
5: For each normal surrogate k, also create a 0-surrogate with a special type  . Create a bipartite graph
Gi between the d` replicas and 2` surrogates. Define the weight between the j-th replica r(j) (ti is also
a replica) and the k-th normal surrogate s(k) using
Wi(r(j), s(k)) = E
t−i∼D−i
[
vi(r(j), x(s(k), t−i))
]
− (1− η) · E
t−i∼D−i
[
pi(s(k), t−i)
]
.
A 0-surrogate has edge weight 0 to every replica, that is Wi(r(j), ) = 0 for all j.
6: Run Algorithm 2 on Gi with parameters δ, η′, and γ. For any edge between a replica r(j) and a
surrogate s(k), we can sample the edge weight by first sampling t−i fromD−i, then queryM on input
(s(k), t−i), and compute vi(r(j), x(s(k), t−i))− (1− η) · pi(s(k), t−i).
7: Suppose the reported type ti of agent i is matched to the k-th normal surrogate or the k-th 0-surrogate.
Let si be the type of the k-th normal surrogate.
8: Sample λ from U[0, 1] and charge the agent qi(ti,λ), which is her payment for Phase 1. qi(ti,λ) is
computed via a modified implicit payment (Defintion 6).
9: end for
Phase 2: Surrogate Competition
10: Run mechanismM on input s = (s1, ..., sn). Let o = (o1, . . . , on) be a random outcome sampled from
x(s). If agent i is matched to a normal surrogate in Phase 1, her outcome is oi and her payment for Phase
2 is (1− η) · pi(s); otherwise the agent gets the outcome ⊥ and pays 0 for Phase 2.
(dropping all the edges incident to any 0-RHS-nodes in the matching), has weight at most O(d`ψ) less than the
maximum weight matching.
5 ε-BIC to BIC Transformation
In this section, we present our ε-BIC to BIC transformation. In Theorem 3, we prove a more general
statement where the given mechanism M is ε-BIC with respect to D =×i∈[n]Di, while we construct
an exactly BIC mechanism M′ with respect to a different distribution D′ =×i∈[n]D′i . If D = D′, the
problem is the ε-BIC to BIC transformation problem. We show that the revenue of M′ under D′ de-
creases gracefully with respect to the Wasserstein Distance of the two distributions. For every i, we de-
note dw(Di,D′i) the `∞-Wasserstein Distance of distributions Di, D′i . We slightly abuse notation and let
dw(D,D′) = ∑ni=1 dw(Di,D′i). We provide the formal definition of the `∞-Wasserstein Distance in Ap-
pendix B.
Theorem 3. Given sample access to distributions D =×i∈[n]Di and D′ =×i∈[n]D′i , and query access to an
ε-BIC and IR mechanismM w.r.t. distribution D. We can construct an exactly BIC and IR mechanismM′ w.r.t.
distribution D′, such that
REV(M′,D′) ≥ REV(M,D)−O(n√ε)−O
(√
n · dw(D,D′)
)
. (4)
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On any input bid b = (b1, . . . , bn),M′ computes the outcome and payments in expected running time poly(n, T′, 1/ε)
and makes in expectation at most poly (n, T′, 1/ε) queries toM, where T ′i is the support ofD′i and T′ = maxi∈[n] |T ′i |.
Furthermore, for any coupling ci(·) betweenDi andD′i such that vi is non-increasing w.r.t. ci(·) 11 (see Section B
for the formal definition), the error bound can be improved as follows:
REV(M′,D′) ≥ REV(M,D)− n√ε−O
(
nη +
nε
η
)
−
∑i∈[n]Et∼D′
[
Eci(ti) [vi (ti, x
′(t))− vi (ci(ti), x′(t))]
]
η
,
(5)
where x′(·) is the allocation rule ofM′ and η can be chosen to be an arbitrary constant in (0, 1).
Inequality (4) is our main result, and provides a strong guarantee in very general settings. Even though
the difference between Inequality (5) and (4) seems small, we like to point out that the difference can be
substantial sometimes and there were indeed cases where one needed a sharper version similar toInequal-
ity (5). In particular, one common application of bounds similar to Inequality (5) is when the coupling
simply rounds values down. For example, the main results in [18, 30] heavily rely on inequalities similar to
Inequality (5), and these results may not be possible if only an Inequality (4) type bounds are used.
The proof of Theorem 3 is postponed to Appendix F.2. When D = D′, dw(D,D′) = 0, the following
corollary states the ε-BIC to BIC transformation.
Corollary 2. If D = D′, REV(M′,D) ≥ REV(M,D)−O (n√ε).
Another useful corollary is when we chooseM to be the optimal BIC and IR mechanism for D, then we
can conclude that the optimal revenue under D′ is not far away from the optimal revenue under D.
Corollary 3. If dw(Di,D′i) ≤ κ for all i ∈ [n], let OPT(D) and OPT(D′) be the optimal revenue achievable by any
BIC and IR mechanism w.r.t. D and D′ respectively. Then |OPT(D)−OPT(D′)| ≤ O(n · √κ).
Our transformation is described in Mechanism 3. To make our description complete, we present Lemma 5
that specifies an algorithm to estimate γ and Definition 6 that defines the payment of Phase 1. We postpone
the proof of Lemma 5 to Appendix C. The approach is similar to Dughmi et al. [24].
Lemma 5. For any agent i, given parameters `, δ, η′, and d ≥ 32 log(8η′−1)
δ2` log2(`)
, fix s to be the ` surrogates, first
draw d` fresh samples from D′i , which we denote using r′. We use OPT(ω) to denote the optimum of (P′′) when
the edge weight between the j-th replica/LHS-node and the k-th normal surrogate/normal RHS-node is ωjk. There
exists a randomized algorithm based only on r′ and s that computes a γ that lies in
[
2·OPT(ω(r′))
d ,
24·OPT(ω(r′))
d
]
with
probability at least 1− η′/2, where ωjk(r′) = Wi(r′(j), s(k)) as defined in Mechanism 3. Moreover, γ is at most
O (max{`, δ` log(`)}) and the algorithm has poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ) running time and makes poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ)
queries to mechanismM.
Furthermore, if r are d` i.i.d. samples from D′i , then OPT(ω(r′)) lies in
[
OPT(ω(r))
2 ,
3·OPT(ω(r))
2
]
with proba-
bility at least 1− η′/2 over the randomness of r and r′, where ωjk(r) = Wi(r(j), s(k)). In this case, γ also lies in[
OPT(ω(r))
d ,
36·OPT(ω(r))
d
]
with probability at least 1− η′.
How do we compute the payment of Phase 1? Note that if any agent i′ ∈ [n] reports truthfully, then the
surrogate si′ who participates for agent i′ in Phase 2 12 is exactly drawn from distribution Di′ . Therefore, if
all the other agents report truthfully, agent i’s value for winning a normal surrogate s is exactly Wi(ti, s) and
0 otherwise. In other words, Mechanism 3 is equivalent to a competition among replicas to win surrogates,
and the edge weight between a replicas and a surrogate is exactly the replica’s value for the surrogate. To
11Roughly speaking, vi is non-increasing w.r.t. a coupling ci if the coupling always couples a “higher” type to a “lower” type.
Namely, for all ti , outcome o ∈ O, if the coupling produces type ti and ci(ti), then vi(ti , o) ≥ vi(ci(ti), o).
12Agent i′ may be matched to a 0-surrogate, then si′ is the type of the corresponding normal surrogate.
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show that Mechanism 3 is BIC, it suffices to prove that the payment of Phase 1 incentivizes the replicas to
submit their true edge weights. As Algorithm 2 is maximal-in-range, such payment rule indeed exists.
If the true type is the j-th replica, and the reported type ti induces edge weights (ωjk)k∈[`], charge the
agent
δ ∑
k∈K
xjk log(xjk) + δ ∑
k∈K
yjk log(yjk) + ∑
k∈K
γα
(j)
k · (xjk + yjk), (6)
where α(j) is the set of dual variables in the j-th iteration of Algorithm 2, xjk =
exp
(
(ωjk−γα(j)k )/δ
)
∑k∈K
(
exp((ωjk−γα(j)k )/δ)+exp(−γα
(j)
k /δ)
) ,
and yjk =
exp
(
(−γα(j)k )/δ
)
∑k∈K
(
exp((ωjk−γα(j)k )/δ)+exp(−γα
(j)
k /δ)
) . Observation 1 implies that the payment rule is BIC. How-
ever, direct implementation of the payment requires knowing the edge weights which we only have sample
access to. We use a procedure called the implicit payment computation [4, 28, 6, 7, 24] to circumvent this
difficulty.
Definition 6 (Implicit Payment Computation). For any fixed parameters δ,η, η′ and γ, let (ωjk)jk be the edge
weights on a [d`]× [2`] size bipartite graph, we use Aj(ω) to denote (xˆj1, . . . , xˆj`, yˆj1, . . . , yˆj`), the allocation of the
j-th LHS-node/replica to the surrogates computed by Algorithm 2 on the bipartite graph. Now, fix r and s, we use
ui(ti, (x, y)) to denote ∑k∈[`] xk ·Wi(ti, s(k)). Suppose agent i’s reported type ti is in position pi, that is, r(pi) = ti.
To compute price qi(ti,λ), let surrogate s′ be the surrogate sampled from Api(W) by Algorithm 2 in step 6, where
W is the collection of edge weights in graph Gi as defined in step 5 of Mechanism 3, and we sample a surrogate s′′
from Api (λWpi , W−pi), where Wpi contains all weights of the edges incident to the pi-th replica, and λWpi is simply
multiplying each weight in Wpi by λ. Then we sample t−i from D−i, the price qi(ti,λ) is
weighti(ti, s′, t−i))− weighti(ti, s′′, t−i)−
√
δ(log(2`) + 1),
where weighti(ti, s, t−i) = vi(ti, x(s, t−i))− (1− η) · pi(s, t−i) if s 6= , otherwise weighti(ti, s, t−i) = 0.
In expectation over s′, s′′ and t−i,
E [qi(ti,λ)] = ui (ti,Api(W))− ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi))−
√
δ(log(2`) + 1),
if we also take expectation over λ,
E
λ∼U[0,1]
[qi(ti,λ)] = ui (ti,Api(W))−
∫ 1
0
ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi)) dλ−
√
δ(log(2`) + 1). 13
With Definition 6, our mechanism is fully specified. We proceed to prove that the mechanism is BIC and
IR. Our transformation is quite robust. Even if the original mechanismM is not ε-BIC or the γ estimated
in step 3 is not a constant factor approximation of OPT(ω(r))d , the mechanism is still BIC and IR. The proof
for truthfulness is similar to the one in Dughmi et al. [24]. However, as our edge weights may be negative,
it is more challenging to establish the individually rationality compared to Dughmi et al. [24]. To make
sure the mechanism is IR, we sometimes need to use negative payments to subsidize the agents, and at
the same time guarantee that the total subsidy is negligible compared to the overall revenue. Note that
this is also different from the previous ε-BIC to BIC transformations [23, 35, 18], as they essentially use the
VCG mechanism to match surrogates to replicas, their mechanisms are clearly individually rational and
use non-negative payments. The proof of Lemma 6 is postponed to Appendix F.1.
Lemma 6. For any choice of the parameters `, d, η, η′, δ and any IR mechanismM,M′ is a BIC and IR mechanism
w.r.t. D′. In particular, we do not require M to be ε-BIC. Moreover, each agent i’s expected Phase 1 payment
E [qi(ti,λ)] is at least −
√
δ(log(2`) + 1). Finally, on any input bid b = (b1, . . . , bn),M′ computes the outcome in
expected running time poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ) and makes in expectation at most poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ) queries toM.
13The difference between Eλ∼U[0,1][qi(ti ,λ)] and Equation (6) is indeed a fixed constant, hence our mechanism is BIC.
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5.1 Bounding the Revenue Loss
Now we sketch the proof of Theorem 3, it suffices to lower bound the revenue ofM′ from the second phase
due to Lemma 6. In the previous transformations [23, 35, 18], the mechanism computes an exact maximum
weight replica-surrogate matching, which allows them to bound the revenue from the second phase di-
rectly. Our mechanism only computes an approximately maximum weight replica-surrogate matching. As
a result, we need to use a more delicate analysis to lower bound the revenue from Phase 2. See Appendix F.2
for details. To facilitate our discussion, we define some new notations.
New Notations: For every agent i, and the corresponding bipartite graph Gi, we define a new bipartite
graph Ĝi whose left hand side nodes are the replicas/LHS-nodes of Gi. For each normal surrogate/RHS-
node of Gi, we duplicate it d times to form the set of right hand side nodes of Ĝi. For the k-th surrogate in Gi,
the (a`+ k)-th surrogate in Ĝi is one of its copies for all 0 ≤ a ≤ d− 1. We do not copy the 0-surrogates to
Ĝi. The edge weights in Ĝi are still defined using Wi(·, ·). Clearly, every d-to-1 matching in Gi corresponds
to a 1-to-1 matching in Ĝi. If replica r is matched to a surrogate s in Gi, simply match r to the first available
copy of s in Ĝi. We use `′ to denote d`, and Ĝi has 2`′ nodes. When we say the matching in Ĝi produced by
Algorithm 2, we mean the matching in Ĝi that corresponds to the matching produced by Algorithm 2 in Gi.
We follow the convention to use r(j) to denote the type of the j-th replica and s(k) to denote the type of the
k-th surrogate in Ĝi. We further simplify the notation and use pi(ti) to denote Et−i∼D−i [pi(ti, t−i)] for any
type ti ∈ Ti.
Given the replica profile r and surrogate profile s, for any matching L(r, s) in Ĝi, we slightly abuse
notation to use Wi(L(r, s)) to denote ∑(r,s)∈L(r,s) Wi(r, s). When the replica profile r and surrogate profile s
are clear from context, we simply use Wi(L) to denote the total weight of the matching L. Since the analysis
mainly concerns the set of surrogates that are matched in a matching, we use s ∈ L(r, s) to denote that the
surrogate s is matched in L(r, s). Let O(r, s) be the (randomized) matching obtained by Algorithm 2 on Ĝi,
V(r, s) be the maximum weight matching in Ĝi.
We first provide a Lemma that relates the expected revenue ofM′ to the size of the matchings.
Lemma 7. Let REV-SECONDi(M′,D′) the expected revenue ofM′ from agent i in Phase 2, REVi(M,D) be the
expected revenue ofM from agent i,
REV-SECONDi(M′,D′) ≥ (1− η) · Er,s
 ∑
s(k)∈O(r,s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ,
and
REVi(M,D) = Es
 ∑
k∈[`′ ]
pi(s(k))/`′

Proof. For every agent i, only when the agent i is matched to a surrogate in O(r, s), she pays the surrogate
price. We can again first sample r and s, and run Algorithm 2 on the corresponding graph Ĝi to find the
matching O(r, s), then choose a replica uniformly at random to be agent i. Since each replica has exactly
probability 1/`′ to be agent i, each surrogate in O(r, s) is selected with probability 1/`′, the expected rev-
enue paid by agent i is exactly (1− η) ·Er,s
[
∑s(k)∈O(r,s)
pi(s(k))
`′
]
. The expected payment from agent i inM
is Eti∼Di [pi(ti)]. Since each s
(k) is drawn from Di, this is exactly the same as Es
[
∑k∈[`′ ] pi(s(k))/`′
]
.
In Lemma 8, we bound the gap between REV-SECONDi(M′,D′) and REVi(M,D). Indeed, we prove a
stronger result that holds for any matching K(r, s) that has close to maximum total weight. The proof of
Lemma 8 is postponed to Appendix F.2.
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Lemma 8. Recall that V(r, s) is the maximum weight matching in Ĝi. LetEr,s [Wi (K (r, s))] = Er,s [Wi (V (r, s))]−
∆. We have
(1− η)E
r,s
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ≥ E
s
 ∑
k∈[`′ ]
pi(s(k))/`′
− n
η +
√
|T ′i |
`
+
ε
η
+
∆
d`η
− 2
η
dw(Di,D′i).
To prove Theorem 3, one only needs to choose K(r, s) to be the matching O(r, s) produced Algorithm 2,
and combine the guarantees in Lemma 6 and 7. Please see Appendix F.2 for more details.
6 Black-box Reduction for Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
In this section, we apply Theorem 3 to the multi-dimensional revenue maximization problem.
Cai et al. [15] provide a reduction from MRM to VWO. More formally:
Theorem 4 (Rephrased from Theorem 2 of Cai et al. [15]). Given the bidders’ type distributions D =×i Di.
Let b be an upper bound on the bit complexity of vi(ti, o) and Pr(ti) for any agent i, any type ti, and any outcome
o, and OPT be the optimal revenue achievable by any BIC and IR mechanisms. We further assume that types are
normalized, that is, for each agent i, type ti and outcome o, vi(ti, o) ∈ [0, 1].
Given oracle access to an α-approximation algorithm G for VWO with running time rtG(x), where x is the bit
complexity of the input, there is an algorithm that terminates in time poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b, rtG
(
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b
)))
, and
outputs a mechanism with expected revenue αOPT− ε that is ε-BIC with probability at least 1− exp(−n/ε). Recall
that T = maxi∈[n] |Ti|. On any input bid, the mechanism computes the outcome and payments in expected running
time poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b, rtG
(
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b
)))
.
We can apply Theorem 3 to the final mechanism produced by Theorem 4 and obtain an exactly BIC
mechanism with almost the same revenue.
Theorem 5. Given the bidders’ type distributions D =×i Di. Let b be an upper bound on the bit complexity of
vi(ti, o) and Pr(ti) for any agent i, any type ti, and any outcome o, and OPT be the optimal revenue achievable by any
BIC and IR mechanisms. We further assume that types are normalized, that is, for each agent i, type ti and outcome
o, vi(ti, o) ∈ [0, 1].
Given oracle access to an α-approximation algorithm G for VWO with running time rtG(x), where x is the bit
complexity of the input, there is an algorithm that terminates in time poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b, rtG
(
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b
)))
, and
outputs an exactly BIC and IR mechanism with expected revenue
REV(M,D) ≥ α ·OPT −O (n√ε) ,
where T = maxi∈[n] |Ti|. On any input bid,M computes the outcome and payments in expected running time
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b, rtG
(
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b
)))
.
The proof of Theorem 5 follows from Theorem 3 and 4. Details are postponed to Appendix G.
Since our Theorem 3 allows us to construct a close to optimal mechanismM′ w.r.t. the type distribution
D′i , if D′ is not too far away from the distribution D thatM is designed , we can approximate the optimal
revenue even when we only have sample access to the bidders’ type distributions. A byproduct of this
result is that the running time of our algorithm no longer depends on the bit complexity of the probability
that a particular type shows up.
Theorem 6. Given sample access to bidders’ type distributions D =×i Di. Let b be an upper bound on the bit
complexity of vi(ti, o) and Pr(ti) for any agent i, any type ti, and any outcome o, and OPT be the optimal revenue
achievable by any BIC and IR mechanisms. We further assume that types are normalized, that is, for each agent i,
type ti and outcome o, vi(ti, o) ∈ [0, 1].
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Given oracle access to an α-approximation algorithm G for VWO with running time rtG(x), where x is the bit
complexity of the input, there is an algorithm that terminates in time poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b, rtG
(
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b
)))
, and
outputs an exactly BIC and IR mechanism with expected revenue
REV(M,D) ≥ α ·OPT −O (n√ε) ,
where T = maxi∈[n] |Ti|. On any input bid,M computes the outcome and payments in expected running time
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b, rtG
(
poly
(
n, T, 1ε , b
)))
.
The complete proof of Theorem 6 can be found in Appendix G.
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A Examples
Example 1. Let N be the number of samples that the algorithm uses to calculate the empirical expectation. Choose
σ > 0 such that σ1−2σ <
1
N . Consider the following example with 1 node on each side. There are two instances. For
the first instance, the random variable F (1) attached to this edge is 1 w.p. 2σ, and − σ1−2σ with probability 1− 2σ.
The edge weight ω(1) = σ. For the second instance, F (2) is σ w.p. 1 and ω(2) = σ.
For the above example, both instances have the same edge weight and any maximal-in-range allocation will always
output the same matching. However in the first instance, with probability (1− 2σ)N < 1 the empirical expectation
is negative and the two nodes are not matched. While in the second instance the algorithm will always match the
two nodes. Thus the output matching is not maximal-in-range. It is well-known that if the allocation is maximal-in-
range, there must exist a payment rule such that the agent is incentive-compatible. Thus the algorithm will violate
the incentive-compatibility when applied to the replica-surrogate matching.
B Additional Preliminaries
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility and Individually Rationality
• Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC):
E
t−i∼D−i
[vi (ti, x (ti, t−i))− pi (ti, t−i)] ≥ E
t−i∼D−i
[
vi
(
ti, x
(
t′i, t−i
))− pi (t′i, t−i)] , ∀i ∈ [n], ti, t′i ∈ Ti.
• Individual Rational (IR):
E
t−i∼D−i
[vi (ti, x (ti, t−i))− pi (ti, t−i)] ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti.
• ε-BIC:
E
t−i∼D−i
[vi (ti, x (ti, t−i))− pi (ti, t−i)] ≥ E
t−i∼D−i
[
vi
(
ti, x
(
t′i, t−i
))− pi (t′i, t−i)]− ε, ∀i ∈ [n], ti, t′i ∈ Ti.
• ε-IR:
E
t−i∼D−i
[vi (ti, x (ti, t−i))− pi (ti, t−i)] ≥ −ε, ∀i ∈ [n], ti ∈ Ti.
Coupling between Type Distributions: In order to measure the difference between the two distributions,
we will introduce the following definition. Fix every agent i. A coupling ci(·, ·) of distribution D′i and Di is
a joint distribution on the probability space T ′i × Ti such that the marginal of ci coincide with D′i and Di.
In the paper we slightly abuse the notation, denoting ci(b) a random variable that is distributed according
to the conditional distribution of type ti over Ti when t′i = b. According to the definition of the coupling,
when t′i ∼ D′i , ci(t′i) ∼ Di.
We say vi is non-increasing w.r.t. the coupling ci if for all ti ∈ T ′i , outcome o ∈ O, and every realized type
ci(ti), vi(ti, o) ≥ vi(ci(ti), o). Intuitively, the coupling always maps a “higher” type to a “lower” type. Such
coupling is common, for example in a combinatorial auction, rounding agent i’s value for each bundle of
items down to the closest multiples of δ can be viewed as such a coupling.
Wasserstein Distance: For any ti, t′i ∈ Vi, let disti(ti, t′i) = maxo∈O |vi(ti, o)− vi(t′i, o)|. The `∞-Wasserstein
Distance between distribution Di and D′i w.r.t. disti is defined as the smallest expected distance among all
couplings. Formally,
dw(Di,D′i) = min
ci(·,·)
∫
disti(ti, t′i)dci(ti, t
′
i)
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C Estimating γ: Approximating the Offline Optimum of the Regular-
ized Matching
In this section, we show how to estimate the parameter γ so that it is a constant factor approximation to
optimum of program (P′′) (see Definition 5) on the replica-surrogate matching in Mechanism 3 with high
probability. Importantly, the estimate is completely independent from the agent’s reported type. Here is
the basic idea. We sample the edge weights between r′ and s, and use the empirical mean to compute the
optimal solution of program (P′′). We show that with polynomially many samples, the optimum of (P′′)
computed based on the empirical means is a constant approximation to the optimum of (P′′) on the true
edge weights with probability almost 1.
Proof of Lemma 5: We prove our statement in two steps. In the first step, we show that if we take polynomially
many samples, we can obtain a sufficiently accurate estimate of ω(r′)jk for each edge (j, k). We prove that
the optimum of (P′′) on the estimated weights is close to OPT(ω(r′)). We use Fjk to denote the distribution
of the random variable vi(r′(j), x(s(k), t−i))− (1− η) · pi(s(k), t−i), where t−i is distributed according toD−i.
Lemma 9 (adapted from [24]). For each edge (j, k) between the j-th replica r′(j) and the k-th normal surrogate s(k),
if we take N ≥ 2 log(4`2dη′−1)
δ2 log2(`)
samples from Fjk, and use ωˆjk(r′) to denote the empirical mean of these N samples,
then with probability at least 1− η′2 ,
OPT(ω(r′))
2
≤ OPT(ωˆ(r′)) ≤ 2OPT(ω(r′)).
Proof. By the Chernoff bound, we know that Pr
[
|ωjk(r)− ωˆjk(r)| ≥ δ log(`)2
]
≤ η′2d`2 for each edge (j, k).
Since there are d`2 many edges, by the union bound, we have that with probability at least 1− η′2 for each
edge (j, k):
|ωjk(r)− ωˆjk(r)| ≤ δ log(`)2
Let (x∗, y∗) be the optimal solution of the (P′′) with edge weights (ωjk(r′))jk and (x∗∗, y∗∗) be the opti-
mal solution of the (P′′) with edge weights (ωˆjk(r′))jk. Then
OPT(ω(r′)) =∑
j,k
(
x∗jkωjk(r
′)− δ ·
(
x∗jk log(x
∗
jk) + y
∗
jk log(y
∗
jk)
))
≥∑
j,k
(
x∗∗jk ωjk(r
′)− δ ·
(
x∗∗jk log(x
∗∗
jk ) + y
∗∗
jk log(y
∗∗
jk )
))
≥ OPT(ωˆ(r′))− d`δ log(`)
2
≥ OPT(ωˆ(r
′))
2
The last inequality holds since a valid assignment is to set yjk = 1/` and xjk = 0 for each j, k, which has
objective value δd` log(`).
The other direction can be proved similarly.
Let A be the total weight of the maximum weight matching with edge weights (ωˆjk(r′))jk. It is clear
that A lies in [OPT(ωˆ(r′))− δd` log(2`), OPT(ωˆ(r′))]. Note that if we set yjk = 1/` and xjk = 0 for
each j, k, the objective of (P′′) has value δd` log(`). Hence, max{A, δd` log(`)} is guaranteed to lie in[
OPT(ωˆ(r′))
3 , OPT(ωˆ(r
′))
]
. If we choose γ to be 12·max{A,δd` log(`)}d , γ is guaranteed to lie in
[
4·OPT(ωˆ(r′))
d ,
12·OPT(ωˆ(r′))
d
]
.
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Due to Lemma 9, γ lies in
[
2·OPT(ω(r′))
d ,
24·OPT(ω(r′))
d
]
with probability at least 1− η′/2. As A can be com-
puted in time poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ), γ can also be computed in time poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ).
In the second step of the proof, we show that OPT(ω(r)) and OPT(ω(r′)) are close with high probabil-
ity. We first need the following Lemma to prove OPT(ω(r)) has bounded difference of 2.
Lemma 10. For any j ∈ [d`], any type r′(j) and replica profile r,∣∣∣OPT (ω(r))−OPT (ω (r′(j), r(−j)))∣∣∣ ≤ 2,
where ωjk
(
r′(j), r(−j)
)
= Wi(r′(j), s(k)) and ωj′k
(
r′(j), r(−j)
)
= ωj′k(r) for any j′ 6= j.
Proof. Let (x∗, y∗), (x∗∗, y∗∗) be the optimal solutions under replica profile r and
(
r′(j), r(−j)
)
for (P′′) re-
spectively. Then
OPT(ω(r)) = ∑
j′∈[d`],k∈[`]
(
x∗j′kωj′k(r)− δ ·
(
x∗j′k log(x
∗
j′k) + y
∗
j′k log(y
∗
j′k)
))
≥ ∑
j′∈[d`],k∈[`]
(
x∗∗j′kωj′k(r)− δ ·
(
x∗∗j′k log(x
∗∗
j′k) + y
∗∗
j′k log(y
∗∗
j′k)
))
≥ ∑
j′ 6=j,k∈[`]
(
x∗∗j′kωj′k(r)− δ ·
(
x∗∗j′k log(x
∗∗
j′k) + y
∗∗
j′k log(y
∗∗
j′k)
))
+ ∑
k∈[`]
(
x∗∗jk
(
ωjk(r′(j), r(−j))− 2
)
− δ ·
(
x∗∗jk log(x
∗∗
jk ) + y
∗∗
jk log(y
∗∗
jk )
))
= OPT(ω(r′(j), r(−j)))− 2
The last inequality is because both ωjk(r) and ω(r′(j), r(−j)) lie in [−1, 1]. The other direction follows
similarly.
Next, we apply McDiarmid’s inequality to the function OPT(ω(r)).
Lemma 11. When d ≥ 32 log(8η′−1)
δ2` log2(`)
, if both r and r′ are collections of d` i.i.d. samples from D′i , then with probability
at least 1− η′2 ,
1
2
OPT(ω(r)) ≤ OPT(ω(r′)) ≤ 3
2
OPT(ω(r)).
The probability is over the randomness of both r and r′.
Proof. Due to Lemma 11, we can apply McDiarmid’s inequality on the function OPT(ω(r)), and we have
Pr
r
[∣∣∣OPT(ω(r))−E
r
[OPT(ω(r)]
∣∣∣ ≥ δd` log(`)
4
]
≤ η
′
4
Similarly, we have
Pr
r′
[∣∣∣OPT(ω(r′))−E
r
[OPT(ω(r)]
∣∣∣ ≥ δd` log(`)
4
]
≤ η
′
4
Hence, with probability at least 1− η′2 ,∣∣OPT(ω(r))−OPT(ω(r′))∣∣ ≤ δd` log(`)
2
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Since δd` log(`) is a lower bound on both OPT(ω(r′)) and OPT(ω(r)) (by setting yjk = 1/` and xjk = 0
for each j, k) we have that with probability at least 1− η′2 ,
1
2
OPT(ω(r)) ≤ OPT(ω(r′)) ≤ 3
2
OPT(ω(r)).
Our statement follows from Lemma 9 and 11 2
D Missing Details from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1:
We prove this in two parts, similarly to [18]. First we argue that the distribution of the surrogate si
that represents the agent, when the agent reports truthfully, is Di. Since we have a perfect matching, an
equivalent way of thinking about the process is to draw ` replicas, produce the perfect matching (the VCG
matching plus the uniform matching between the unmatched replicas and surrogates) and then pick one
replica uniformly at random to be the agent. These two processes produce the same joint distribution
between replicas, surrogates and the agents i. So we can just argue about the second process of sampling.
Since the agent is chosen uniformly at random between the replicas in the second process, the surrogate si
that represents the agent, will also be chosen uniformly at random between all the surrogates. Thus, the
distribution of si is Di.
We need to argue that for every agent i reporting truthfully is a best response, if every other agent is
truthful. In the VCG mechanism, agent i faces a competition with the replicas to win a surrogate. If agent i
has type ti, then her value for winning a surrogate with type si in the VCG mechanism is exactly the edge
weight
Wi(ti, si) = E
t−i∼D−i
[vi(ti, x(si, t−i))]− (1− η) · E
t−i∼D−i
[pi(si, t−i)] .
Clearly, if agent i reports truthfully, the weights on all incident edges between her and all the surrogates
will be exactly her value for winning those surrogates. Since agent i is in a VCG mechanism to compete for
a surrogate, reporting the true edge weights is a dominant strategy for her, therefore reporting truthfully
is also a best response for her assuming the other agents are truthful. It is critical that the other agents are
reporting truthfully, otherwise agent i’s value for winning a surrogate with type si may be different from
the weight on the corresponding edge.
2
E Missing Details from Section 4
Observation 1. For every j, α(j) and parameter γ, match j according to the Gibbs distribution (xˆj, yˆj) to the available
2|K| RHS-nodes in K,
xˆjk =
exp
(
(ωjk − γα(j)k )/δ
)
∑k∈K
(
exp((ωjk − γα(j)k )/δ) + exp(−γα
(j)
k /δ)
) , yˆjk = exp
(
(−γα(j)k )/δ
)
∑k∈K
(
exp((ωjk − γα(j)k )/δ) + exp(−γα
(j)
k /δ)
)
maximizes
∑
k∈K
xjkωjk − δ ∑
k∈K
xjk log(xjk)− δ ∑
k∈K
yjk log(yjk)− ∑
k∈K
γα
(j)
k · (xjk + yjk),
subject to the constraint ∑k(xjk + yjk) = 1.
Observation 2. For every dual variables α ∈ [0, h]` the optimal solution x∗, y∗ maximizing the Lagrangian
L((x, y), α) of program (P”) subject to the constraints ∑k(xjk + yjk) = 1, ∀j ∈ [d`] is
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x∗jk =
exp(
ωjk−αk
δ )
∑k′
(
exp(
ωjk′−αk′
δ ) + exp(
−αk′
δ )
) , ∀j ∈ [d`], ∀k ∈ [`]
y∗jk =
exp(−αkδ )
∑k′
(
exp(
ωjk′−αk′
δ ) + exp(
−αk′
δ )
) , ∀j ∈ [d`], ∀k ∈ [`]
Hence
x∗jk
y∗jk
= exp(ωjk/δ), ∀j, k
Proof of lemma 4: For every j, k, we observe that
xjk
zjk
=
exp(ωjk/δ)
1+exp(ωjk/δ)
, hence zjk =
xjk(1+exp(ωjk/δ))
exp(ωjk/δ)
. We simplify
the equality that we need to prove to Equation (7).
zjk · ζδ(ωjk)− δ · zjk log(zjk) = xjk ·ωjk − δ · xjk log(xjk)− δ · yjk log(yjk)
⇐⇒ ζδ(ωjk)− δ log(zjk) = xjkzjk ωjk − δ
xjk
zjk
log(xjk)− δ yjkzjk log(yjk) (7)
Since:
ζδ(ωjk) = δ log(exp(ωjk/δ) + 1) (8)
δ log(zjk) = δ log
( xjk(1+exp(ωjk/δ))
exp(ωjk/δ)
)
= δ log(xjk)− δ log(exp(ωjk/δ)) + δ log(1+ exp(ωjk/δ))
= δ log(xjk)−ωjk + ζδ(ωjk) (9)
So the LHS of Equation (7) equals to ωjk − δ log(xjk). How about the RHS of Equation (7)?
xjk
zjk
ωjk − δ
xjk
zjk
log(xjk)− δ
yjk
zjk
log(yjk)
=
exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
ωjk − δ
exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
log(xjk)− δ 11+ exp(ωjk/δ) log
(
xjk
exp(ωjk/δ)
)
=
exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
ωjk − δ
exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
log(xjk)− δ 11+ exp(ωjk/δ) log
(
xjk
)
+ δ
1
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
log
(
exp(ωjk/δ)
)
=
exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
ωjk − δ
exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
log(xjk)− δ 11+ exp(ωjk/δ) log
(
xjk
)
+
1
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
ωjk
=
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
ωjk − δ
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
1+ exp(ωjk/δ)
log(xjk)
=ωjk − δ log(xjk) (10)
Hence, Equation (7)) holds. Since the optimal values x∗jk, y
∗
jk satisfy the requirements by Observation 2,
we have that the optimum of (P′) is at least as large as the optimum of (P′′). On the other hand, let z∗ be
the optimal solution of (P′), we can choose x∗jk and y
∗
jk so that x
∗
jk + y
∗
jk = z
∗
jk and
x∗jk
y∗jk
= exp(ωjk/δ). Clearly,
(x∗jk, y
∗
jk)jk is a feasible solution to (P
′′), therefore the optimum of (P′) is at most as large as the optimum of
(P′′). Combining. the two claims, we prove that (P′) and (P′′) have the same optimal objective values. 2
Lemma 12. With parameter δ ≥ 0, let (x∗, y∗) be the optimal solution of (P′′). The optimum of (P′′), ∑j,k x∗jkωjk −
δ ·∑j,k(x∗jk log(x∗jk) + y∗jk log(y∗jk)), is no smaller than the weight of the maximum weight matching.
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Proof. Let x′ be the maximum weight matching. It is not hard to see that we can construct a 0− 1 vector y′
so that (x′, y′) is a feasible solution of (P′′). As both x′ and y′ only take values in 0 or 1, the entropy term
−∑j,k x′jk log(x′jk)−∑j,k y′jk log(y′jk) = 0. Hence, the optimum of (P′′) is at least as large as the weight of the
maximum weight matching ∑jk x′jkωjk.
Proof of Theorem 2: As the algorithm always produces a matching that respects the constraints of (P′′), the
first property clearly holds. As the set of available RHS-nodes K and the dual variables α(j) only depend
on the first j− 1 LHS-nodes but not the LHS-node j, the maximal-in-range property follows from Obser-
vation 1. The algorithm runs in d` rounds, step 3 and 4 both take O(`) time. Step 5 takes expected time
poly(γ, `, 1/δ) and poly(γ, `, 1/δ)-many samples from distributions (Fjk)k to complete. Hence, the running
time and sample complexity as stated in the second property.
If we execute Algorithm 1 on a d-to-1 matching with weights (ζδ(ωjk))jk and Algorithm 2 over weights
(ωjk)jk with the same parameters δ, η′,γ, we can couple the two executions so that the dual variables α(j)
and the remaining capacities (d(j)k )k are the same for every j. We introduce the new notation K
(j) which
is exactly the set of available RHS-nodes K in step 2 of both algorithm in round j. Note that K(j) is de-
terministically determined by (d(j−1)k )k. If α
(j) and K(j) are the same in both algorithms for every j, then
xˆjk + yˆjk = zˆjk for every j ∈ [d`] and k ∈ K(j). To verify this, simply observe that
zˆjk = exp(
ζδ(ωjk)− γα(j)k
δ
) = (exp(
ωjk
δ
)+ 1) · exp(−γα
(j)
k
δ
) = exp(
ωjk − γα(j)k
δ
)+ exp(
−γα(j)k
δ
) = xˆjk + yˆjk.
How does the coupling work? We construct it by induction. In the base case where j = 1, clearly
everything is the same in both algorithms. Suppose the dual variables α(1), . . . , α(j) and the remaining
capacities (d(1)k )k, . . . , (d
(j)
k )k are all the same for the first j rounds, we argue that we can couple the two
executions in round j+ 1 so that α(j+1) and (d(j+1)k )k remain the same in both algorithms. First, the set K
(j+1)
is the same, which implies that the dual variables α(j+1) are also the same. Next, Algorithm 1 samples a
RHS-node k according to distribution zˆj+1 and Algorithm 2 samples a RHS-node according to distribution
(xˆj+1, yˆj+1). Note that xˆ(j+1)k + yˆ(j+1)k = zˆ(j+1)k, so wherever Algorithm 1 matches the LHS-node j + 1 to
a RHS-node k we match the LHS-node j + 1 to the normal RHS-node k with probability
xˆ(j+1)k
zˆ(j+1)k
and to the 0-
RHS-node with probability
yˆ(j+1)k
zˆ(j+1)k
. Clearly, this coupling makes sure the new remaining capacities (d(j+1)k )k
also remain the same. Combining the coupling with Lemma 4, we conclude that
G(zˆ) =∑
j,k
zˆjk · ζδ(ωjk)− δ ·∑
j,k
zˆjk log(zˆjk) =∑
j,k
xˆjkωjk − δ ·∑
j,k
(xˆjk log(xˆjk) + yˆjk log(yˆjk)) = F(xˆ, yˆ).
By Theorem 1, the expected value of G(zˆ) is a (1−O(η′)) multiplicative approximation to OPT(P′), if
we choose the parameters according to the third property of the statement. Therefore, the expected value
of F(xˆ, yˆ) is a (1−O(η′)) multiplicative approximation to OPT(P′). Since the optimum of (P′′), OPT(P′′),
is the same as OPT(P′) (Lemma 4), the expected value of F(xˆ, yˆ) is also a (1−O(η′)) multiplicative ap-
proximation to OPT(P′′). Now, invoke Lemma 12, we know that the expected value of F(xˆ, yˆ) is at least a
(1−O(η′)) multiplicative approximation to the weight of the maximum weight matching, which we de-
note as OPT. Note that the entropy term −δ ·
(
∑j,k xˆjk log(xˆjk) +∑j,k yˆjk log(yˆjk)
)
is non-negative and at
most δd` log(2`), hence the expected weight of the matching produced by Algorithm 2, the expected value
of ∑j,k xˆjkωjk, is at least (1−O(η′)) ·OPT− δd` log(2`).
If we choose δ = Θ( ψlog ` ), η
′ = Θ(ψ), then δd` log(2`) = Θ(d`ψ) and O(η′) · OPT = O(d`ψ) as
OPT ≤ d`. Thus, the expected weight of the matching produced by Algorithm 2 is within an additive
error of Θ(d`ψ) from the weight of the maximum weight matching. This completes our proof for the third
property.
2
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F Missing Details from Section 5
F.1 BIC, IR, and Implicit Payment Computation
Proof of Lemma 6:
M′ is BIC: We prove the Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in two parts. The first part is similar to the
proof of Lemma 1. We argue that the distribution of the normal surrogate si that represents agent i in Phase
2, when the agent i reports truthfully, is Di. Note that for any matching Algorithm 2 produces, the k-th
normal surrogate and the k-th 0-surrogate together are matched to exactly d replicas for every k ∈ [`]. As
the d`− 1 replicas and the agent’s type are all drawn from the same distribution D′i , we can simply treat all
of them as replicas and uniformly choose one to be the agent reported type after Algorithm 2 terminates.
Therefore, the surrogate si that represents the agent, will also be chosen uniformly at random between all
the normal surrogates. Thus, the distribution of si is Di.
If all the other agents report truthfully, agent i’s value for winning a surrogate s is exactly Wi(ti, s) if her
true type is ti. In other words, under the assumption that all other agents report truthfully, Mechanism 3
for agent i is equivalent to a competition among replicas to win surrogates, and the edge weight between a
replica and a surrogate is exactly the replica’s value for winning the surrogate. To show that Mechanism 3
is BIC, it suffices to prove that at any position pi,
ui(ti,Api(W(t′i)))−E
λ
[qi(t′i,λ)]
is maximized when the reported type t′i equals to the true type ti. Here W(t
′
i) is simply the collection of the
edge weights when r(pi) = t′i, and the function ui(·) is defined in Definition 6. A result by Rochet [34] implies
that this is indeed the case. Interested readers can find a modern restatement of the result in Theorem 2.1
of [6] 14.
M′ is IR: The expected utility for agent i with type ti at position pi is
ui(ti,Api(W))−E
λ
[qi(ti,λ)] =
∫ 1
0
ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi)) dλ+
√
δ(log 2`+ 1), (11)
where W is the collection of weights in Gi when agent i reports truthfully. We will first prove that for any
λ ∈ [0, 1], ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi)) is at least− δ log(2`)λ . Denote H(x, y) = −∑k(xk log(xk) +∑k yk log(yk)) as
the entropy for distribution (x, y).
Let (x′′pi , y′′pi) be Api(λWpi , W−pi). By Observation 1,
(x′′pi , y′′pi) = argmax(xpi ,ypi)∑
k
xpik · λWpik + δ · H(xpi , ypi)−∑
k
γα
(pi)
k · (xpik + ypik)
By considering an alternative solution (0, x′′pi + y′′pi), we have
∑
k
x′′pik · λWpik+δ · H(x′′pi , y′′pi)−∑
k
γα
(pi)
k · (x′′pik + y′′pik)
≥ 0− δ ·∑
k
(x′′pik + y
′′
pik) log(x
′′
pik + y
′′
pik)−∑
k
γα
(pi)
k · (x′′pik + y′′pik)
Since −∑k(x′′pik + y′′pik) log(x′′pik + y′′pik) ≥ 0,
14To apply Theorem 2.1 of [6] to our setting, one should think of each surrogate as an outcome, and the corresponding edge weight
as the value for the outcome. In other words, a replica’s type is the weights on the incident edges. As the matching is computed by
a maximal-in-range algorithm, we can allow the edge weights to be arbitrary numbers, and the induced allocation rule will still be
implementable in an incentive compatible way. As a result, we can apply Theorem 2.1 of [6] to our setting. Note that the incentive
compatible payment rule it gives is off by an absolute constant compared to our payment rule in Definition 6.
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ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi)) =∑
k
x′′pik ·Wpik ≥ −
δ
λ
H(x′′pi , y′′pi) ≥
−δ log(2`)
λ
.
Another lower bound for ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi)) is−1, as the mechanismM is IR, by definition of the edge
weight Wpik ≥ −1 for all k ∈ [`]. Now, we are ready to lower bound the utility
RHS of Equation (11) ≥
∫ 1
√
δ
−δ log(2`)
λ
dλ+
∫ √δ
0
−1dλ+
√
δ(log 2`+ 1)
= −δ log(1/
√
δ) log(2`)−
√
δ+
√
δ(log(2`) + 1)
≥ −
√
δ log(2`) +
√
δ log(2`)
= 0
Next, we prove thatM′ does not lose too much revenue by subsidizing the agents in Phase 1.
Eλ[qi(t′i,λ)] is at least −
√
δ(log(2`) + 1): It suffices to show that
ui (ti,Api (W)) ≥ ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi))
for any λ ∈ [0, 1). We still use (x′′pi , y′′pi) to denote Api(λWpi , W−pi) and (xˆpi , yˆpi) to denote Api (W).
By Observation 1, both allocations are maximal-in-range for the same dual variables α(pi). Hence, the
following two inequalities are true.
∑
k
xˆpikWpik + δ · H(xˆpi , yˆpi)−∑
k
γα
(pi)
k · (x′pik + y′pik) ≥∑
k
x′′pikWpik + δ · H(x′′pi , y′′pi)−∑
k
γα
(pi)
k · (x′′pik + y′′pik)
∑
k
x′′pikλWpik + δ · H(x′′pi , y′′pi)−∑
k
γα
(pi)
k · (x′′pik + y′′pik) ≥∑
k
xˆpikλWpik + δ · H(xˆpi , yˆpi)−∑
k
γα
(pi)
k · (xˆpik + yˆpik)
Summing up the two inequalities together, we have
∑
k
(xˆpik − x′′pik)Wpik(1− λ) ≥ 0.
Since λ ∈ [0, 1),
ui (ti,Api (W))− ui (ti,Api (λWpi , W−pi)) =∑
k
(xˆpik − x′′pik)Wpik ≥ 0.
Finally, we analyze the time and query complexity of the mechanism.
Time and Query Complexity: All steps except Step 3,6, and 8 clearly has poly(d, `) time and query com-
plexity. According to Lemma 5, Step 3 has poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ) time and query complexity. Since γ is guar-
anteed to be at most max{`, δ` log `}, Algorithm 2 in Step 6 has time and query complexity poly(d, `, 1/δ)
according to Theorem 2. From Definition 6, it is clear that Step 8 also has time and query complexity at
most poly(d, `, 1/δ). Hence, the mechanismM′ has time and query complexity poly(d, `, 1/η′, 1/δ).
2
F.2 Missing Details of Section 5.1
Instead of proving Lemma 8, we prove the following strenthened version of the statement.
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Lemma 13. Let Er,s [Wi (K (r, s))] = Er,s [Wi (V (r, s))]− ∆. We have
(1− η)E
r,s
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ≥ E
s
 ∑
k∈[`′ ]
pi(s(k))/`′
−
η +
√
|T ′i |
`
+
ε
η
+
∆
d`η
− 2
η
dw(Di,D′i).
Moreover, for any coupling ci(·) that vi is non-increasing w.r.t. ci(·), the last term can be improved to
− 1
η`′ Er,s
 ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈K(r,s)
E
ci(r), t−i∼D−i
[
vi(r(j), x(s(k), t−i))− vi(ci(r(j)), x(s(k), t−i))
] .15
Proof of Lemma 13: To prove the statement, we consider an arbitrary coupling ci(·, ·) of distribution D′i andDi (see Section B for our definition for coupling between type distributions). For every replica r ∈ T ′i , ci(r)
is a random type from Ti. For every realization of the types ci(r) =
(
ci(r(j))
)
j∈[`′ ]
, we consider the maximal
matching that matches a replica r(j) with a surrogate s(k) only if ci(r(j)) = s(k). We denote the matching
as L(ci(r), s) and refer to it as the maximal coupled same-type matching. In the next Lemma, we argue that in
expectation of r, s and the realization of ci(r), the expected size of L(ci(r), s) is close to `′.
Lemma 14. For any r, s, and realization of ci(r) =
(
ci(r(j))
)
j∈[`′ ]
, let L(ci(r), s) be a maximal coupled same-type
matching, then
E
r,s,ci(r)
[|L(ci(r), s)|] ≥ `′ −
√
d
∣∣T ′i ∣∣ · `′.
Proof. To prove the result, we first invoke the following Lemma.
Lemma 15 (Adapted from [26]). Let r′ be N replicas drawn i.i.d. from distribution D′i , and s′ be N surrogates
drawn i.i.d. from distribution Di. For any coupling ci(·) between D′i and Di, the expected cardinality of a maximal
matching that only matches a replica r and a surrogate s when ci(r) = s is at least N −
√
|T ′i | · N. The expectation
is over the randomness of r′, s′, and the coupling ci(r′).
Although we have `′ replicas and `′ surrogates, we cannot directly apply Lemma 15, as the surrogates
are not i.i.d. samples from Di. Instead, we partition Ĝi into d subgraphs. The α-th subgraph contains all
replicas r(j) and surrogates s(k) with j and k lie in [α`+ 1, (α+ 1)`]. If we only consider the α-th subgraph,
due to our construction of Ĝi, the replicas are all sampled i.i.d. fromD′i and the surrogates are also sampled
i.i.d. from Di. Therefore, Lemma 15 implies that a maximal coupled same-type matching in the α-th sub-
graph has expected size at least `−
√
|T ′i |`. Since there are d subgraphs, so the expected size of a maximal
coupled same-type matching is at least `′ −
√
d
∣∣T ′i ∣∣ · `′.
Now, it suffices to argue that the total payment from surrogates that are in L(ci(r), s) but not in K(r, s) is
small. Indeed, when K(r, s) is the maximum weight matching, one can directly prove the claim. However,
K(r, s) only has approximately maximum weight, and it appears to be difficult to directly compare K(r, s)
with L(ci(r), s). Instead, we construct an auxiliary matching based on both K(r, s) and L(ci(r), s). For any
r, s and realization of types
(
ci(r(j))
)
j∈[`′ ]
, we decompose the union of these two matchings into a set of
disjoint alternating paths and cycles. Every surrogate that appears in L(ci(r), s) but not in K(r, s) must be
an endpoint of some alternating path. These alternating paths have the following two forms:
(a). It starts with a surrogate in L(ci(r), s)\K(r, s) and ends with a surrogate in K(r, s)\L(ci(r), s) with the
form
(
s(1), r(1), s(2), r(2), ..., r(a), s(a+1)
)
.
15For the rest of the proof, when we use the notation Eci(r)[·], we are taking the expectation over the randomness of the coupling.
The ci(r) =
(
ci(r(j))
)
j∈[`′ ]
inside the expectation is the realized type after coupling.
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(b). It starts with a surrogate in L(ci(r), s)\K(r, s) and ends with a replica with the form(
s(1), r(1), s(2), r(2), ..., s(a), r(a)
)
.
We use P to denote the set of all alternating paths of form (a) and (b). We construct a new matching
K′(ci(r), s) as follows: start with the matching K(r, s), for any alternating path P of form (a) and (b), swap
the edges in K(r, s) with the ones in L(ci(r), s), that is, replace all edges in P ∩ K(r, s) with edges in P ∩
L(ci(r), s). Since all the alternating paths are disjoint, K′(ci(r), s) is indeed a matching.
Corollary 4.
E
r,s,ci(r)
 ∑
s(k)∈K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ≥ E
s
 ∑
k∈[`′ ]
pi(s(k))/`′
−
√
|T ′i |
`
.
Proof. Fix r, s and types {ci(r(j))}j∈[`′ ]. For any alternating path P of form either (a) or (b), P ∩ L(ci(r), s)
is the same as P ∩ K′(ci(r), s). For other alternating paths, the matched surrogate in P ∩ L(ci(r), s) is a
subset of P ∩ K(r, s). Thus the number of the matched surrogates in K′(ci(r), s) is at least |L(ci(r), s)|. By
Lemma 14, Er,s,ci(r)[|{k : s(k) 6∈ K′(ci(r), s)}|] ≤
√
d|T ′i | · `′. AsM is IR, pi(s) ≤ 1 for any surrogate s ∈ Ti.
Therefore,
E
r,s,ci(r)
 ∑
s(k)∈K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ≥ E
s
 ∑
k∈[`′ ]
pi(s(k))/`′
−
√
|T ′i |
`
.
Equipped with Corollary 4, we only need to compare K(r, s) with K′(ci(r), s).
Lemma 16.
E
r,s
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ≥ E
r,s,ci(r)
 ∑
s(k)∈K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))/`′
− 1
η
(ε+
∆
`′ )−
2
η
dw(Di,D′i)
Moreover, for any coupling ci such that vi is non-increasing w.r.t. ci, the last term can be improved to
− 1η Et∼D′ [vi(ti, x′(t))− vi(ci(ti), x′(t))].
Proof. Fix any r, s and realization of ci(r). Observe that if we decompose the union of K(r, s) and K′(ci(r), s)
into alternating path and cycles, we will end up with many length 2 cycles and all the alternating paths in
P . Hence, we only need to consider the paths in P .
Consider any k ∈ [a] if the path has form (a) (or k ∈ [a− 1] if the path has form (b)), note that ci(r(k)) =
s(k), as this is also an edge in the matching L(ci(r), s). SinceM is ε-BIC, we have
E
t−i∼D−i
[vi(ci(r(k)), x(s(k), t−i))]− pi(s(k)) ≥ Et−i∼D−i[vi(ci(r(k)), x(s(k+1), t−i))]− pi(s(k+1))− ε,
which is equivalent to
Wi(r(k), s(k))−Wi(r(k), s(k+1))
≥ −ε− η · (pi(s(k+1))− pi(s(k))) + ∆i,ci (r(k), s(k))− ∆i,ci (r(k), s(k+1))
(12)
where ∆i,ci (r, s) = Et−i∼D−i [vi(r, x(s, t−i))− vi(ci(r), x(s, t−i))].
By summing up Inequality (12) for each k, we are able to relate the difference of the total weight between
K(r, s) and K′(ci(r), s) with the total payment from surrogates in K(r, s) and K′(ci(r), s).
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• For any form (a) path,
a
∑
k=1
(
Wi(r(k), s(k+1))−Wi(r(k), s(k))
)
≤a · ε+ η · (pi(s(a+1))− pi(s(1)))−
a
∑
k=1
(
∆i,ci (r(k), s(k))− ∆i,ci (r(k), s(k+1))
)
• For any form (b) path
a−1
∑
k=1
(
Wi(r(k), s(k+1))−Wi(r(k), s(k))
)
−Wi(r(a), s(a))
≤(a− 1) · ε+ η ·
a−1
∑
k=1
(
pi(s(k+1))− pi(s(k))
)
−Wi(r(a), s(a))−
a−1
∑
k=1
(
∆i,ci (r(k), s(k))− ∆i,ci (r(k), s(k+1))
)
≤(a− 1) · ε− η · pi(s(1))−
a
∑
k=1
∆i,ci (r(k), s(k)) +
a−1
∑
k=1
∆i,ci (r(k), s(k+1))
The last inequality is because η · pi(s(a)) −Wi(r(a), s(a)) ≤ −∆i,ci (r(a), s(a)), which is implied by the
fact thatM is IR.
To sum up, for any alternating path P ∈ P ,
∑
(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K(r,s)
Wi(r(j), s(k))− ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K′(ci(r),s)
Wi(r(j), s(k))
≤ |P ∩ K(r, s)| · ε+ η ·
 ∑
s(k)∈P∩K(r,s)
pi(s(k))− ∑
s(k)∈P∩K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))
+ DIFF(P), (13)
where DIFF(P) = ∑(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K(r,s) ∆i,ci (r
(j), s(k))−∑(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K′(ci(r),s) ∆i,ci (r(j), s(k)).
Since V(r, s) is the maximum weight matching, we have
∑
P∈P
 ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K(r,s)
Wi(r(j), s(k))− ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K′(ci(r),s)
Wi(r(j), s(k))

=Wi(K(r, s))−Wi(K′(ci(r), s))
≥Wi(K(r, s))−Wi(V(r, s))
(14)
Note that if we are using the matching L(ci(r), s) instead of K′(ci(r), s), we can no longer prove Inequal-
ity (14). The reason is quite subtle. It is possible that L(ci(r), s) has much higher weight than K(r, s) on
paths in P , but much smaller weight on the rest alternating path and cycles. In that case, the first equal sign
will be replaced by a less equal sign, which makes the inequality meaningless. By comparing to K′(ci(r), s),
we can avoid this issue.
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Combining Inequality (13) and (14) , we have
Wi(K(r, s))−Wi(V(r, s))
≤ ∑
P∈P
 ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K(r,s)
Wi(r(j), s(k))− ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K′(ci(r),s)
Wi(r(j), s(k))

≤ ∑
P∈P
|P ∩ K(r, s)| · ε+ η ·
 ∑
s(k)∈P∩K(r,s)
pi(s(k))− ∑
s(k)∈P∩K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))
+ DIFF(P)

≤`′ · ε+ η ·
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))− ∑
s(k)∈K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))]
+ ∑
P∈P
DIFF(P)
Finally, we take expectation over r, s, and ci(r).
E
r,s
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))
− E
r,s,ci(r)
 ∑
s(k)∈K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))

≥ 1
η
(
−`′ · ε+ E
r,s
[Wi (K (r, s))]− Er,s [Wi (V (r, s))]− Er,s,ci(r)
[
∑
P∈P
DIFF(P)
])
≥− 1
η
(`′ · ε+ ∆)− 1
η
E
r,s,ci(r)
[
∑
P∈P
DIFF(P)
]
For every type r, s, and realized type ci(r), ∆i,ci (r, s) = Et−i∼D−i [vi(r, x(s, t−i))− vi(ci(r), x(s, t−i))] ∈
[−disti(r, ci(r)), disti(r, ci(r))] (recall that disti(r, ci(r)) = maxo∈O |vi(r, o)− vi(ci(r), o)|). Thus
∑
P∈P
DIFF(P) ≤ 2
`′
∑
j=1
disti(r(j), ci(r(j))),
and
E
r,s,ci(r)
[
∑
P∈P
DIFF(P)
]
≤ 2`′dw(Di,D′i).
Therefore,
E
r,s
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ≥ E
r,s,ci(r)
 ∑
s(k)∈K′(ci(r),s)
pi(s(k))/`′
− 1
η
(ε+
∆
`′ )−
2
η
dw(Di,D′i).
If vi is non-increasing w.r.t. ci, then ∆i,ci (·, ·) is a non-negative function. Then
∑
P∈P
DIFF(P) ≤ ∑
P∈P
∑
(r(j),s(k))∈P∩K(r,s)
∆i,ci (r
(j), s(k)) ≤ ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈K(r,s)
∆i,ci (r
(j), s(k)),
and
E
r,s,ci(r)
[
∑
P∈P
DIFF(P)
]
≤ E
r,s
 ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈K(r,s)
E
ci(r), t−i∼D−i
[
vi(r(j), x(s(k), t−i))− vi(ci(r(j)), x(s(k), t−i))
] .
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Finally, we are ready to prove Lemma 13. Note that for every s(k), pi(s(k)) ≤ 1 sinceM is -IR. We have
(1− η) · E
r,s
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))/`′
 ≥ E
r,s
 ∑
s(k)∈K(r,s)
pi(s(k))/`′
− η.
The lemma follows from Lemma 16 and Corollary 4. 2
Proof of Theorem 3: First, by Lemma 7, we can lower bound the revenue ofM′ underD′ from agent i in Phase
2 REV-SECONDi(M′,D′) by (1− η)Er,s
[
∑s(k)∈O(r,s) pi(s
(k))/`′
]
, where O(r, s) is the matching produced by
Algorithm 2 on Ĝi. Lemma 7 also provides an equivalent expression for the revenue ofM under D from
agent i: REVi(M,D) = Es
[
∑k∈[`′ ] pi(s(k))/`′
]
.
We choose the parameters according to Theorem 2, that is, for any ψ ∈ (0, 1), we set δ = Θ( ψlog ` ),
η′ = Θ(ψ) and d ≥ ` log `
η′2 . Theorem 2 implies that Er,s [Wi (O (r, s))] = Er,s [Wi (V (r, s))]−O(d`ψ), that is
in expectation O (r, s) has close to maximum weight. We will specify the choice of the other parameters `,
η, and ψ later. By Lemma 13, we know that
REV-SECONDi(M′,D′) ≥ REVi(M,D)−
η +
√
|T ′i |
`
+
ε
η
+
O(ψ)
η
− 2dw(Di,D′i)
η
(15)
Combining Inequality (15) with Lemma 6, we can obatain the following lower bound on REV(M′,D′).
REV(M′,D′) ≥ REV(M,D)− ∑
i∈[n]
(
η +
√
T′
`
+
ε
η
+
O(ψ)
η
)
− 2dw(D,D
′)
η
− n
√
δ(log(2`) + 1) (16)
Now we set ` = T
′
ε , ψ =
ε2
log ` , and we can choose η to be O
(√
ε+ dw(D,D
′)
n
)
so that
REV(M′,D′) ≥ REV(M,D)−O
(
n
(√
ε+
√
ε+
dw(D,D′)
n
))
−Θ(nε)
≥ REV(M,D)−O(n√ε)−O
(√
n · dw(D,D′)
)
Plugging in our choice of the parameters to Lemma 6, we can conclude that both the computational and
query complexity ofM′ is poly(n, T′, 1/ε).
If ci(·) that vi is non-increasing w.r.t. ci(·), we can replace the last term − 2dw(Di ,D
′
i )
η in Inequality (15) by
− 1
η`′ Er,s
 ∑
(r(j),s(k))∈O(r,s)
E
ci(r), t−i∼D−i
[
vi(r(j), x(s(k), t−i))− vi(ci(r(j)), x(s(k), t−i))
] .
Note that this quantity is the same as
− 1
η
E
t∼D′
[
E
ci(ti)
[
vi
(
ti, x′(t)
)− vi (ci(ti), x′(t))]] .
Hence, for any η ∈ (0, 1), we can improve the result to
REV(M′,D′) ≥ REV(M,D)− n√ε−O
(
nη +
nε
η
)
−
∑i∈[n]Et∼D′
[
Eci(ti) [vi (ti, x
′(t))− vi (ci(ti), x′(t))]
]
η
.
2
32
G Missing Details of Section 6
Proof of Theorem 5: When the mechanism computed by Theorem 4 is ε-BIC, our transformation converts it
into a BIC mechanism with at most O(n
√
ε) less revenue. The important property of our transformation
as stated in Lemma 6 is that even if the initial mechanism is not ε-BIC, our transformation still produces
an exactly BIC mechanism. In this case, we can still treat the given mechanism as 1-BIC and IR, and use
the corresponding revenue guarantees provided by Theorem 3. Since the probability that the mechanism
computed by Theorem 4 is not ε-BIC is exponentially small, we can absorb the loss from this exponentially
small event in the error term O(n
√
ε). The time complexity follows from Theorem 3 and 4. 2
Proof of Theorem 6: We can create an empirical distribution D˜i for each bidder i, such that dTV(Di, D˜i) ≤ ε′, ∀i,
with probability at least 1− θ using O(∑ni |Ti |
2
ε′2 ln
∑nj=1 |Tj |
θ ) samples.
We first consider the case where dTV(Di, D˜i) ≤ ε′, ∀i. Then, dw(Di, D˜i) ≤ dTV(Di, D˜i) ≤ ε′, as the
highest value for any outcome is at most 1. Apply Theorem 4 on D˜ =×ni=1 D˜i and let M˜ be the produced
mechanism, O˜PT be the optimal revenue achievable by any BIC and IR mechanism w.r.t. D˜. Clearly,
Theorem 4 guarantees that REV(M˜, D˜) ≥ α · O˜PT− ε. According to Corollary 3,
|OPT− O˜PT| ≤ O
(
n
√
ε′
)
.
We set θ = ε and ε′ = ε, we apply Theorem 3 to M˜, that is, the replicas are sampled from D and the
surrogates are sampled from D˜. LetM be the constructed mechanism, and Theorem 3 guarantees that
REV(M,D) ≥ REV(M˜, D˜)−O (n√ε) ≥ α · O˜PT−O (n√ε) ≥ α ·OPT−O (n√ε) ,
if M˜ is a ε-BIC and IR mechanism. Otherwise, we know that M˜ is a 1-BIC and IR mechanism, and this
happens with exponentially small probability according to Theorem 4, so we can absorb the loss from this
case in O
(
n
√
ε
)
. To sum up, if dTV(Di, D˜i) ≤ ε′, ∀i, then REV(M,D) ≥ α ·OPT−O
(
n
√
ε
)
.
With probability ε we may get unlucky and dTV(Di, D˜i) may be larger than ε for some i. In that case
we still constructM in the same way, and we can apply Theorem 3 by upper bounding dw(D, D˜) by n and
treating M˜ as a 1-BIC and IR mechanism, which shows REV(M,D) ≥ −O(n).
Therefore, in expectation of the randomness of the samples used to estimate D˜,
REV(M,D) ≥ (1− ε) · (α ·OPT−O (n√ε))−O(nε) = α ·OPT−O(n√ε),
as OPT ≤ n. Note that even though mechanismM depends on D˜ and M˜, it is always BIC and IR w.r.t. D.
The time complexity follows from Theorem 3 and 4. 2
H A Brief Introduction to Bernoulli Factories
Suppose we are given a coin with bias µ, can we construct another coin with bias f (µ) using the original
coin? If the answer is yes, then how many flips do we need from the original coin to simulate the new coin?
A framework that tackles this problem is called Bernoulli Factories. We refer the reader to [31] for a survey
on this topic.
Definition 7 (Keane and O’Brien [29]). Given some function f : (0, 1) 7→ (0, 1) and black-box access to indepen-
dent samples of a Bernoulli random variable with bias p, the Bernoulli factory problem is to generate a sample from a
Bernoulli distribution with bias f (p).
A useful generalization of the previous model is the following16: given sample access to distributions
D1,D2, . . . ,Dm with expectations µ1, µ2, . . . , µm ∈ (0, 1), and a function f : (0, 1)m → ∆(X), where X is a set
16The model is called Expectations from Samples in [24].
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of feasible outcomes and ∆(X) is a set of probability distributions over these outcomes, how can we want
generate a sample from f (µ1, . . . , µm)?
Below we state an important result from [24], which we use in this paper. It proposes an algorithm
called Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race with X = [m]. For every λ > 0, it produce a sample from the Gibbs
distribution with temperature 1λ and energy µi for each outcome i, given only sample access to distributionsD1,D2, . . . ,Dm.
Theorem 7. [24] Given any parameter λ > 0 and sample access to distributions F1,F2, . . . ,Fm with expectations
µ1, µ2, ...µm ∈ (0, 1), there exists an algorithm that can sample from a Gibbs distribution in ∆m, where
zi =
exp(λµi)
∑j∈[m] exp(λµj)
,
using O(λ4m2 log(λm)) samples in expectation.
In both Algorithm 1 and 2, every LHS-node is matched to a random RHS-node according to some Gibbs
distribution. The following corollary from Theorem [24] states that such a sample can be generated using (in
expectation) polynomially many samples in `, 1δ and γ, which is the maximum value of the dual variables.
Corollary 5. For any integer m, any δ > 0, and any (αk)k∈[m] ∈ [0, h]m, given sample access to distributions
F1, . . . ,Fm with expectations w1, . . . , wm ∈ [−1, 1], a sample from the following Gibbs distribution in ∆m:
zk =
exp((wk − αk)/δ)
∑j∈[m] exp((wj − αj)/δ)
,
can be drawn with
(
4+h
δ
)4
m2 log
(
(4+h)m
δ
)
samples from (Fk)k∈[m] in expectation.
Proof. First, notice that (zk)k∈[m] can also be represented as the Gibbs distribution with temperature δh+4
and energy
Ωk =
ωk − αk + h + 2
h + 4
, k ∈ [m].
Note that since −1 ≤ wk ≤ 1 and αk ≤ h, then:
0 <
wk − αk + h + 2
h + 4
< 1.
Thus, by Theorem 7 with λ = h+4δ , we can generate a sample according to (zk)k∈[m] with
(
4+h
δ
)4
m2 log
(
(4+h)m
δ
)
samples in expectation.
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